

Making Space for Women: Explaining Citizen Support for Legislative Gender Quotas in Latin America¹

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Abstract (150 words)

Gender quotas have been adopted in over a hundred countries in an effort to address gender disparities in national legislatures. Yet, the determinants of citizen support for gender quota policies remain largely understudied. We develop a theory that emphasizes the impact of institutional performance and political values to explain citizen support for gender quotas and how these two factors differentially influence men's and women's quota support. Based on data for 24 Latin American countries, we find that citizens in countries with relatively good governance quality who express a strong preference for government involvement to improve citizens' wellbeing show the highest levels of quota support. Further, whereas good governance increases quota support at a higher rate among men than women, preferences for government involvement exert a stronger influence on women's support for quotas. Consequently, good governance quality reduces the gender gap in quota support by substantially increasing men's support for quotas.

Key Words: Gender Quotas, Public Opinion, Governance Quality, Gender Gap; Latin America

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Women are underrepresented in the vast majority of political decision-making bodies worldwide (Bauer and Tremblay 2011; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; O'Brien 2015). This global trend undermines one of democracy's core principles—political equality (Dahl 2006). In light of this challenge, since the early 1990's international organizations have pressed for government action to correct gender inequalities in political representation. These initiatives have resulted in the enactment of gender quota policies in more than a hundred nations (IDEA 2015), with Latin America being “in the vanguard of the gender quota movement” (Jones 2009, 56). As of 2015, close to half the countries in this region had implemented a state-mandated legislative gender quota—a law requiring parties to reserve space for women on their list of legislative candidates.

Extant research has examined the effectiveness of quotas for increasing women's numeric representation (O'Brien and Rickne *forthcoming*; Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Tripp and Kang 2008), their effect on the representation of ordinary women's interests (Barnes 2016; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008), and their impact on symbolic representation (Alexander 2012; Barnes and Burchard 2013; Clayton 2015; Zetterberg 2009). Scholars have also explored the influence of international advocates (Bush 2011; Hughes et al. 2015) and domestic elites (Htun and Jones 2002) in the initial adoption of gender quotas. Yet, a fundamental question has received little attention: *What factors promote higher levels of citizen support for state-mandated legislative gender quotas?*

Citizen support for quota policies has important implications for the legitimacy of democratic regimes. If quota adoption is met with low approval, increases in women's numeric representation in parliament may ultimately come at the cost of political legitimacy (Meier 2008). The legitimacy of the political system will always be in question as long as a large share of citizens does not perceive institutions designed to select representatives as “the most appropriate and proper ones” (Lipset 1983, 64). If citizens do not regard political institutions as legitimate, they may disengage from the political system, resulting in low participation and consequently in weak

democracy. Indeed, Clayton (2015, 26) provides evidence that when gender quotas are adopted “without local buy-in,” quota policies generate “negative unintended attitudinal reactions.” Her findings indicate that perceiving quotas as illegitimate ultimately lead citizens to disengage with the polity.

We contribute to the gender and public opinion literatures by developing and systematically testing an integrative theory of how individuals’ political values and a country’s institutional performance influence citizen support for state-mandated legislative gender quotas. We theorize that, at the individual level, citizens who view the government as responsible for improving ordinary citizens’ wellbeing—and hence *support government involvement*—will exhibit greater support for quota policies. Individual level mechanisms are not, however, sufficient to explain variation in support for gender quotas across countries. We also posit that heuristic information derived from *governance quality* moderates the relationship between individual preferences for government involvement and support for quotas. More specifically, our theory highlights the importance of a government’s track record to consistently deliver positive policy outcomes across issue areas for cultivating quota support.

If the capacity of the entire government apparatus is limited, citizens are likely to be cynical about its ability to deliver promised outcomes and thus will perceive the adoption of quotas as largely inconsequential for significantly advancing equality in society. Consequently, in this case, citizens will exhibit low levels of support for gender quotas. Moreover, poor governance will attenuate the positive impact of individual preferences for government involvement on support for quota policies. In sum, simply favoring government involvement *in principle* is insufficient to engender support for quotas when *in practice* one’s government has failed to demonstrate that it can make a substantial difference through the implementation of public policies. As we show below, the theory we develop also allows us to explain the cross-national variation that exists between men and

women in levels of quota support.

Latin America offers a fitting setting to test our hypotheses. First, the substantial variation in governance quality across Latin American countries allows us to evaluate our theorized connection between institutional performance and quota support. Moreover, available public opinion data for the vast majority of countries in the region facilitates a systematic assessment of the determinants of support for quotas. Thus, although our theory is general and can be tested in other contexts, existing data allow us to focus on Latin America. The study of citizen support for gender quotas in the Latin American context is, however, a particularly pressing issue. Close to half of the countries in the region have already adopted gender quotas, and their adoption continues to spread. In order to enhance the legitimacy of democratic regimes, it is imperative to identify the factors that promote citizen support for political institutions designed to improve gender equality in Latin America.

Our findings carry with them important policy implications. First and foremost, our results make it clear that unless governments demonstrate capacity to govern effectively, a variety of affirmative action policies benefiting marginalized groups, such as gender quotas, are unlikely to receive widespread public support. And we know from previous research that citizen support is critical for policy enactment and maintenance as well as future reforms (Brooks and Manza 2007; Soroka and Wlezién 2010). Thus, even though international actors and domestic elites have played an important role in quota adoption, there is every reason to believe that citizen support for gender quota policies can be instrumental not only for the adoption and continuation of quotas, but also for the improvement of quota design. Numerous examples suggest that this has been the case in the Latin American context.

The “popular mobilization” of ordinary women to demand the adoption of quotas was an important factor in ushering change in many countries across Latin America and other regions of the world (Baldez 2004, 237). For example, in Argentina, on November 6, 1991, women’s

movements orchestrated a “massive mobilization” (Carrio 2005, 166) of over five-thousand women, who filled the parliamentary galleries, hallways, and overflowed onto the streets, to pressure political elites to adopt the quota law (Cham 2001). Beyond quota adoption, women’s movements also motivated ordinary women to agitate for reforms to strengthen existing quota laws in Latin American countries such as Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador (Araújo and García 2006). Many of these efforts were met with success, suggesting that ordinary citizens have influenced the process of quota adoption and reform in the region. Citizen support for quotas can then be particularly important for pressing political elites to expedite the strengthening of the quota laws recently enacted in El Salvador (municipal quotas) and Chile in 2015, which will certainly require additional reforms to be effective over time (Piscopo 2015). Taken together, our theory and findings indicate that good governance quality is critical for cultivating citizen support for gender quotas, which can ultimately result in the adoption and improvement of quota laws to guarantee high and continued women’s numeric representation in parliament.

Our research also has important theoretical and policy implications beyond gender quota laws. As we elaborate in the conclusion, the theoretical framework we develop here can guide future research to identify the role of governance quality on citizen support for policies designed to improve the political representation of other disadvantaged and minority groups in society, such as ethnic and religious minorities. More broadly, our aim is to inform future research evaluating how governance quality influences citizen support for a variety of policies designed to strengthen democracy, including electoral and other institutional reforms. Improvements in governance quality may well also prove necessary for fostering citizen support for many of the policies currently topping the agendas of policy-makers around the world.

Explaining Citizen Support for Gender Equality Policies: Previous Studies

Prior research shows various individual traits and attitudes influence citizen support for gender

equality policies. Sex, for example, is an important predictor of citizen support for policies that benefit women (Cassese and Hannagan 2014; Deckman and McTeague 2015). Due to *self-interest*, citizens are expected to favor policies that are likely to benefit them (e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981; Sears and Funk 1990). Accordingly, existing work on support for gender quotas among citizens in Canada (Gidengil 1996) and political elites in Belgium (Meire 2008) finds that women are more likely to favor quotas than men. Previous research also shows that women are more likely than men to favor gender equality (Morgan and Buice 2013), and hence also more likely to support gender equality policies such as fair-pay, parental leave, and protection from job discrimination in hiring and promotion (Cassese et al. 2015; Strolovitch 1998).

Although these findings give strong support to the self-interest thesis, empirical literature also demonstrates that self-interest is not enough to explain variation in citizen support for public policies in general, and gender equality policies in particular. *Pro-social values* are also important determinants of support for public policies (Funk 2000). Belief in equality of opportunity (egalitarianism), for instance, predicts citizens' preferences for welfare policies (Bobo 1991; Feldman 1988). In the case of gender issues, individuals who hold gender egalitarian values report higher support for gender equality policies. Cassese et al. (2015), for example, find that in the U.S., citizens who exhibit sexist attitudes are less likely to support policies to ensure equal pay for equal work between men and women.

We argue that explanations that focus on self-interest and pro-social values are still insufficient to explain support for quotas. As we theorize in the next section, at the individual-level, *political values* (i.e., preferences for government involvement) should also play an important role in shaping citizen quota support. Yet, individual-level accounts of citizen support for quotas still fall short. We maintain that explanations that do not consider the effect of contextual-factors are incomplete. Accordingly, we develop an integrative theoretical model that takes into account the role

of both individual and contextual factors.

How do Citizens Form Opinions on Public Policy? An Integrative Theoretical Model

We develop two sets of related hypotheses on how personal political values and contextual factors reinforce each other and together explain support for public policies. Although our theory is broad and can be applied to the study of public opinion on an array of public policies, our substantive focus is on citizen support for gender quota policies. At the individual level, we expect that, on average, favoring government involvement for improving citizens' wellbeing will increase gender quota support. In addition, we posit that the strength of this individual-level relationship will vary across countries. Contextual factors related to institutional performance will condition the impact of citizens' preferences for government involvement on quota support across countries, and also influence the overall-level of support for such quotas. Moreover, we draw hypotheses on how these dynamics differentially shape men's and women's quota support. Below we develop the theoretical basis for each of these claims and derive our specific hypotheses.

The Impact of Political Values

Citizens' core political values are also important determinants of support for public policy. In particular, independent of ideological orientations (as measured by traditional liberal-conservative or left-right scales), citizens' normative beliefs about the role government should play in improving living conditions shape policy preferences (Kumlin 2007),² with those supporting government activism being more inclined to attribute responsibility to government for reducing inequality and protecting marginalized groups (Goren 2013). Accordingly, individuals who demand government intervention are more supportive of race-based affirmative action policies (Bobo and Kluegel 1993). Building on this research we posit that gender-based affirmative action, in our case gender quotas,

²Ideology is only weakly correlated with citizens' beliefs about the role of government (Goren 2013; Zechmeister and Corral 2012), suggesting that these constructs are theoretically distinct.

will on average enjoy higher support among those who favor an active role of government in improving ordinary citizens' lives. Consequently, we test the following hypothesis:

***H1:** On average, citizens who express higher support for government involvement to improve citizens' wellbeing will be more likely to support state-mandated gender quota policies.*

At the same time, however, we also argue that support for government involvement is more likely to translate into high support for affirmative action policies for some citizens than others. Citizens have different beliefs about the origins of social inequality, which in turn affect their support for policies designed to benefit marginalized groups, including gender equality policies (Burns and Gallagher 2010). Regarding gender issues, some citizens attribute gender inequality to discrimination and fewer opportunities in society, whereas others blame women's personal choices (Gurin 1985). Those who believe gender inequality is a product of structural barriers are more likely to support government intervention to mitigate gender disparities (Krook et al. 2009). Consequently, we argue that individuals who simultaneously attribute gender disparities to unequal opportunities and also believe it is the government's responsibility to improve citizens' lives are more likely to support laws that give women a chance to be included in the candidate lists of political parties—i.e., gender quotas. By contrast, people who believe that gender inequality is due to individual women's choices are likely to reject government intervention intended to increase opportunities for women to compete for public office (Gidengil 1996; Krook et al. 2009), regardless of their overall level of support for government involvement.

We posit that these dynamics have important consequences for determining how support for government involvement differentially affects men's and women's quota support. Even if both men and women favor government involvement, because men are far less likely than women to attribute gender disparities to unfair treatment and limited opportunities (Swim et al. 1995), men are subsequently much less likely than women to translate their general views on government involvement into support for gender quotas. For example, previous studies clearly demonstrate that

women are more likely than men to believe that wage gaps occur due to differential treatment in the workplace and society (Cassese et al. 2015). Consequently, women are much more likely than men to consider government involvement essential for reducing wage gaps. Because men, by contrast, are more likely to believe that wage gaps are the product of individual women's choices, they tend to conclude that ensuring equal pay for women is "not the government's business" (Cassese et al. 2015, 13). Similarly, because women are more likely than men to attribute the underrepresentation of women in political posts to discrimination (Gidengil 1996), their support for government involvement on social issues will also hold the government responsible for leveling the playing field for women. Taking into account these insights, we derive the following hypothesis:

H2: Citizens who express higher support for government involvement will be more likely to support state-mandated gender quota policies, and this effect will be stronger for women than for men.

Governance Quality as Heuristic Information

Even after considering their political values and predispositions, citizens may still lack the information needed to firmly determine their stand on a given policy. As a result, they are likely to seek external sources of information. In the absence of complete information, citizens resort to cues or messages they retrieve through "top of the head" processes with the objective of making inferences about a policy issue and subsequently determine their position on the policy (Zaller 1992). "Source cues" in particular—references to prominent political actors or institutions—serve as important heuristic information that can ease individuals' decisions on how much support to concede to a policy when they lack full information (Mondak 1992, 1993). Political institutions involved in the execution of a given policy can then condition citizens' policy endorsement. More specifically, literature in political psychology suggests that an institution's credibility aids citizens to evaluate the significance of policies associated with the institution, and thus influences their level of policy support (Bartels and Mutz 2009). As Mondak (1992, 458) explains, institutional credibility functions as "a political currency" that allows political institutions to "purchase some increment of

policy approval.” These insights have important implications for the building of a theoretical model of citizen support for state-mandated gender quotas and other policies.

The first implication we draw from this literature is that the credibility of government, as given by the extent of governance quality in a country, is likely to provide important heuristic information employed by citizens to decide their level of support for public policy, including support for gender quota implementation. Through a top of the head process, citizens are likely to search for objective evidence in their national context about their government’s institutional credibility in being able to successfully execute its policy intentions. More specifically, our theory is distinct as it posits that, when determining their level of policy support, citizens rely on retrospective performance evaluations of the entire government apparatus they derive from their national context, and that those evaluations are not limited to the incumbent’s administration but go farther in time.

In contrast to literature on policy support that focuses on the effect of a lone political institution’s credibility, such as the reputation of political parties (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981), the supreme court (Mondak 1992) or congress (Bartels and Mutz 2009), we maintain that citizens assess the worth of a given policy by processing heuristic information from their national context on the institutional capacity of government as a whole, and thus on the capacity of the different institutions that make up government to work cooperatively and consistently produce good policy outcomes. Indeed, cross-national empirical evidence shows that the overall quality of policy is highly dependent on the capacity of different entities of government not only to efficiently carry out their individual mission, but also to coordinate their efforts and work towards a common goal (Stein and Tommasi 2007). Consistent with this view, individual-level studies for the U.S. demonstrate that confidence in government rooted in perceptions of government performance increases citizen support for public policy that benefits racial minorities (Hetherington and Globetti 2002; Hetherington 2005). Here we theorize that citizens resort to heuristic information on governance quality they obtain from their

national context to inform their decision on their level of policy support. Consequently, our theory identifies the national context as an important source of heuristic information.

The second part of our argument states that the extent of a government's credibility is likely to hinge on its demonstrated capacity to *consistently* deliver good policy outcomes across policy areas. For instance, even if the incumbent administration competently implements a given policy, if the government has a track record of consistently failing to deliver across a range of policy domains that affect ordinary citizens' day-to-day lives (such as failure to provide basic services or fight crime and corruption), the government is unlikely to gain sufficient credibility in the eyes of the public to secure high policy support. Thus, independent of the incumbent administration's performance, the credibility of government is largely determined by its overall governance trajectory. Hence, we posit that a track record of poor governance lowers citizens' support for public policy. Conversely, a track record of good governance will instill confidence in government and increase support for public policy, including gender quotas. Taking into account these propositions, we derive the following hypothesis:

***H3:** In countries with a better track record of governance quality, citizens will be, on average, more likely to support state-mandated gender quota policies.*

Although citizens are likely to rely on heuristic information derived from governance quality (i.e., source cues) to determine their level of policy support, recent research suggests that they will also take into account the content of the policy being described (Bullock 2011). Consequently, expressed policy preferences are not simply derived from readily accessible information in citizens' minds such as the credibility of government, but also from their assessments of the policy in question. We extend this argument and posit that the degree to which citizens rely on heuristic information relative to policy content largely depends on citizens' personal interest in the policy being described. Self-interest motivations will be weighted more heavily in women's considerations to support gender equality policies than heuristic information provided by source cues, even if

women had no prior knowledge of or experience with the policy. This implies that women will have a higher level of quota support than men, independent of whether a country has adopted a quota.

In contrast, in the absence of strong self-interest motivations, men will rely more heavily on source cues than on policy content to form their opinions on gender equality policies. Indeed, previous cross-national research shows that, when men form their opinions on gender issues, they are more amenable to elite cues derived from national context than women (Morgan and Buice 2013; Morgan et al. 2008). Consequently, we argue that the credibility of government will have greater influence in men's level of support for gender quotas than women's. Previous studies suggest that this is plausible. Hetherington and Globetti's (2002) findings for the U.S., for example, indicate that at the individual-level, confidence in government has a stronger effect on policy support among individuals who do not benefit directly from the policy. More specifically, we posit that heuristic information derived from national context on a government's track record of performance will particularly aid men to determine their extent of support for quota policies, independent of their initial level of information about quotas and whether or not their country has already adopted gender quotas laws. Therefore, we hypothesize that:

H4: In countries with a better track record of governance quality, citizens will be more likely to support state-mandated gender quotas, and this effect will be stronger for men than women, thereby reducing the gender gap in quota support.

Bringing Individual and Contextual Factors Together

The theoretical ideas presented above suggest that both personal political values and contextual factors related to governance quality will independently influence support for quotas, and that each of these elements will have a differential effect on men's and women's levels of quota support. Political values and governance quality, however, are unlikely to work independently from each other. Our expectation is that governance quality will moderate the individual-level relationship between preferences for government involvement and support for quotas. This is because even if an

individual holds normative beliefs that attribute responsibility to government in improving citizens' wellbeing, the same individual might not be highly supportive of the actual implementation of public policies that seek to achieve this goal if governance quality is poor. Therefore, a track record of poor government performance will attenuate the positive relationship between support for government involvement and support for quotas. In contrast, a track record of good governance quality will reinforce the positive impact of preferences for government involvement on quota support, as citizens will have more faith that this policy will actually lead to positive outcomes for society in general and women in particular. Consequently, H5 reads as follows:

H5: The positive relationship between support for government involvement and support for state-mandated gender quota policies will be stronger in countries with a better track record of governance quality than in countries with a poor track record of governance quality.

We are then left with an integrative theoretical model that predicts interactive effects between three central variables: support for government involvement, governance quality, and sex. Support for quotas should peak among individuals who live in countries with relatively good governance and who also strongly support government involvement. Moreover, our theory indicates that, at the individual level, personal political values exert a stronger effect on women's attitude formation than on men's, increasing the gender gap particularly among citizens who strongly support government involvement. Nonetheless, in countries with good governance, the overall gender gap will be offset due to the stronger effect of governance quality on support for quotas among men than women. Thus, in countries with good governance we should observe a smaller overall gender gap in support for quotas than in countries with poor governance. The end result is an overall higher level of support for quotas and a smaller gender gap in countries with good governance quality in comparison to those with poor governance. Thus, our final hypothesis states:

H6: Countries with a better track record of governance quality will show an overall higher level of citizen support for state-mandated gender quota policies, particularly among citizens with high support for government involvement, and a smaller overall gender gap.

Dependent Variable

To evaluate the extent of citizen support for quotas, we employ a survey question included in the 2012 round of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey in 24 countries. On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), respondents were asked their extent of agreement with the following statement: *“The state should require political parties to reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men.”*


The wording of this survey item is particularly well suited for the Latin American case, because the vast majority of gender quotas that have been adopted across the region are state mandated legislative gender quotas in which the state requires political parties to place female candidates on their party ballot. Another advantageous feature of the wording of this item is that it provides a description of the policy rather than referring to “gender quotas” per se. Consequently, even if a respondent is not familiar with the expression “gender quotas,” she can still formulate an opinion on the policy described. Indeed, in countries with no quotas, when asked about their level of support for quotas using this survey item, only 2.6% of interviewees responded “do not know” and only 0.83% refused to provide an answer. The corresponding percentages in countries with quotas are virtually identical, 2% and 0.8% respectively.

Based on data for this survey item across the 24 countries in our sample, the average level of support for gender quotas is about 5 points on the 1-7 scale. Yet, there is also wide variation in support levels across countries, ranging from 3.73 in Trinidad and Tobago to 5.95 in El Salvador (Figure 1). A One-Way ANOVA test revealed that differences in support for gender quotas across the 24 countries are statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), suggesting that, once individual-level factors are taken into account, country-level characteristics may explain some of this variation.³ As depicted

³Based on the One-Way-ANOVA decomposition, we find that the proportion of the total variance that is accounted for by the variance between countries (i.e., the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient,

by the frequency distributions of the gender quota item across countries in Figure 1, there is also substantial within country variation in quota support. In El Salvador, for example, quota support is highly skewed, resulting in the lowest within country variation in our sample (SD = 1.52). More than half (53%) of Salvadorans express the highest level of support for gender quotas (7 points on the 7-point scale), and only a small fraction (4%) expresses the lowest level of support (1 point on the scale). Belize, by contrast, is the case with the largest within country variation (SD = 2.34). Although 41% of respondents express the highest level of support for quotas in Belize, 20% express the lowest level of support. Our theory seeks to explain the variation in quota support observed both between and within countries.

Figure 1. Frequency Distribution: Support for Gender Quotas by Country



ICC) is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) and equal to about 7 percent. As explained in previous studies (e.g., Anderson and Singer 2008), in cross-national research the variation between countries depicted by the ICC tends to be relatively small in studies that use survey data, because the number of cases at the individual level is much larger than the number of cases at the country-level. Our results clearly show that our core independent variable at the country level, governance quality, has a large and statistically significant effect on quota support.

Individual and Country-Level Independent Variables

Our core independent variables at the individual level are sex and normative views about government involvement.⁴ Gender differences in quota support are assessed with the measure, *Sex*, coded 1 for women and 0 for men. *Support for government involvement* is measured with an index based on agreement with the following four survey items that capture citizens' views about government responsibility (vis-à-vis individuals or the private sector) for improving citizens' quality of life:

1. The government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people.
2. The government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs.
3. The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor.
4. The government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services.

Responses for each of the items range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Factor analysis indicated that all four items load on a single factor and measure the same underlying construct—support for government involvement (see Table A4 in the Online Appendix). The internal reliability of the index as measured by the Cronbach's alpha coefficient is 0.81. The index was scaled to range from 1 to 7, with 7 indicating the highest level of support.

At the country-level, our core independent variable is a measure of *Governance Quality*. We use the Government Capabilities Index from the Political Institutions, Government Capabilities, and Public Policy International Dataset by the Inter-American Development Bank (Chuaire and Scartascini 2014). This index is particularly suitable for our study, because it captures overall governance quality across several policy areas and a government's general capacity to *consistently* deliver good policy outcomes, which we posit will serve as salient heuristic information for citizens to evaluate a government's credibility. Instead of focusing on a single policy area, the Government

⁴See the Online Appendix for details on the coding, wording, and descriptive statistics of all variables in our analyses. Tables A1 to C2 and Figures A1 to C3 are located in the Online Appendix.

Capabilities Index measures a government's overall policymaking capacity. Moreover, the index takes into account the combined performance of four institutions found to be particularly important for predicting a government's policymaking capacity—the legislature, political parties, the judiciary, and the bureaucratic apparatus (Stein and Tommasi 2007).⁵ Finally, the measure incorporates the combined performance of these political institutions over more than a decade, instead of solely focusing on the performance of the incumbent administration. Values on the index range from 0 to 4, with lower values indicating lower levels of governance quality. Measured in this way, governance capacity in our sample ranges from a low of .342 for Haiti to a high of 2.39 for Chile and Jamaica.⁶

In addition to our main independent variables, we control for a number of country and individual level variables. Our argument suggests that a government's overall governance quality will influence citizens' support for quota policies, independent of gender quota implementation. Consequently, at the country level, we include in our models a *Gender Quota Index*, which takes into account whether a country had implemented a state mandated gender quota before the LAPOP survey was fielded; and if it did, whether a placement mandate and enforcement mechanisms had also been implemented. Indeed, to ensure an effective quota policy, electoral engineers often promulgate rules that require parties to place female candidates in electable positions on their candidate lists (Baldez 2004; Krook 2009), and also dictate enforcement mechanisms that require all

⁵For a description of the Government Capabilities Index see the Online Appendix B. Importantly, to avoid a tautological relationship between the index and support for gender quota policies, the index excludes policies related to the adoption of gender quotas, the gender composition of the legislature, or the type of electoral system in place (i.e., that may affect the likelihood of women being elected to office).

⁶As a further robustness test, we replicate our analysis with an alternative measure of governance quality that relies on a different measurement strategy: the World Bank's Government Effectiveness Index. As we report in the Online Appendix (Table 7A and Figures A1-A4), our results remain substantively unchanged if we use the Government Effectiveness Index. A description of the Government Effectiveness Index is provided in Online Appendix B.

parties competing in elections to comply with the quota rules (Jones 2009; Schwindt-Bayer 2009).⁷ Finally, we test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of variables that account for *Years since Quota* implementation and the *Percent of Women in Parliament* (Table A8), to test the possibility that the effect of governance quality on support for quotas is confounded by the longevity of quota laws or women’s numeric representation in parliament.

To control for spurious sources of the relationship between good governance and support for quotas, we also control for other country-level factors, such as the *Gross National Income (GNI) per capita* using the most recent estimates available prior to the LAPOP survey. We also test the robustness of our results by including a measure of the level of democracy (*Democracy Level*) at the country-level. Based on data from Freedom House International for 2011, “partly free” countries in our sample are coded 1 and “free” countries are coded zero. Finally, because the correlation between the *Governance Quality*, *GNI*, and *Democracy Level* variables is relatively high (ranging from 0.52 to 0.64), we show that our results are robust whether we include or exclude the democracy variable (Table 1 below) and whether we use an alternative measure of democracy, Polity IV (Table A9).

At the individual-level, since we hypothesize that the impact of support for government involvement will be independent of *Ideology* and *Gender Egalitarian Attitudes*, measures of both variables are included as controls. Ideology is measured by asking respondents to place themselves on a ten point left-right scale. To simplify the analysis, this variable is collapsed into three categories denoting nominal ideology—Left, Center and Right. Given that non-response rates are high for ideology, we also recode non-response values as a category and include it in the analysis. To measure gender egalitarian attitudes, we employ a survey item that asks respondents their extent of agreement with the following statement: “some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women.” We also test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of two

⁷For more details about the construction of this variable, see Table A2.

alternative measures of gender egalitarian attitudes (Tables A10 and A11).

To ensure that our results are independent of evaluations of the current government's performance, we control for a variable measuring *Perceptions of Incumbent Government's Performance*, which is an index based on four questions in the LAPOP survey asking citizens to rate the performance of the current administration on different policy domains, including its capacity to improve the economy and fight corruption.⁸ As the inclusion of women in politics is likely to be favored primarily among those who value democratic principles, we include a measure of *Citizen Support for Democracy* using a survey item that asks citizens to what extent they agree that “democracy is better than other forms of government.” Finally, we control for socioeconomic status and individual characteristics known to impact support for social policies including age, education, household wealth,⁹ employment status, urban versus rural residence, marital status, and number of children.

Methods

To examine the country and individual level determinants of support for gender quotas, we estimate multilevel models that allow us to account for the nested nature our data—i.e., individuals i within countries j (Snijders and Bosker 2012). A key characteristic of multilevel models is that coefficients can be allowed to vary randomly between groups (in our case countries). In their most basic form, multilevel models assume random effects for the coefficient associated with the intercept, and each group is allowed to have its own intercept. This feature is convenient, because, in contrast to classical regression analysis, it allows the estimation of standard errors taking into account the correlation of error terms within groups, producing more accurate results. In addition to a random intercept specification, researchers can also allow the coefficients associated with other variables in

⁸See Table A5 for details about this variable.

⁹For details on the construction of this variable, see Córdova (2009).

the model to vary randomly between groups. Yet, as Snijders and Bosker (2012, 106) explain, if there is theoretical reason to believe that an interaction between an individual and group level variable exists, as we do in this paper, this interactive effect can be tested using cross-level interaction terms, regardless of whether the individual-level variable has a random slope or not. The reason for this is that statistical tests for cross-level interactions supersede tests for random slopes (Ibid.).¹⁰ Following this advice, we test the significance of a three-way cross-level interaction between *Sex*, *Support for Government Involvement*, and *Governance Quality* assuming only random intercepts (not random slopes). Thus, if our integrative theory is supported we expect to find a positive and significant coefficient associated with this three-way cross-level interaction term.

To evaluate H1 and H3, we first need to estimate a baseline model (without the specification of cross-level interaction terms). Specifically, we expect that, on average, individuals who support government involvement will exhibit higher levels of support for quotas (H1). In addition, we expect governance quality to have an independent direct positive effect on quota support (H3). As a second step, we compare the results of our baseline model with one that includes a three-way interaction between sex, support for government involvement, and governance quality. The three-way interaction model specification also includes all lower order terms that allow us to test our interactive hypotheses (H2 and H4-H6) while we hold other factors constant. Given that our dependent variable is ordinal (7-point scale), we estimate the following ordered logistic multilevel models with random intercepts:¹¹

¹⁰ Snijders and Bosker (2012, 106) write: if there is a significant cross-level interaction, “the test for this interaction has a higher power to detect this [interaction] than the test for the random slope.”

¹¹All models are estimated in Stata 13.1 using the “meologit” command.

Baseline Model:

$$\text{Support Quota}_{ij} = \beta_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Sex}_{1ij} + \alpha_2 \text{Support Gov. Involvement}_{2ij} + \beta_1 \text{Governance Quality}_{1j} + \dots \beta_n X_{nij} + U_{0j} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Three-Way Interaction Model:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Support Quota}_{ij} = & \beta_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Sex}_{1ij} + \alpha_2 \text{Support Gov. Involvement}_{2ij} + \beta_1 \text{Governance Quality}_{1j} \\ & + \gamma_1 \text{Governance Quality}_{1j} * \text{Sex}_{1ij} + \gamma_2 \text{Support Gov. Involvement}_{2ij} * \text{Sex}_{1ij} \\ & + \gamma_3 \text{Support Gov. Involvement}_{2ij} * \text{Governance Quality}_{1j} \\ & + \gamma_4 \text{Governance Quality}_{1j} * \text{Support Gov. Involvement}_{2ij} * \text{Sex}_{1ij} + \dots \beta_n X_{nij} \\ & + U_{0j} + \varepsilon_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

where, U_{0j} represent random effects for the intercept across countries, and ε_{ij} are errors at the individual-level.

Findings

Models 1 and 2 in Table 1 present the results associated with our baseline model. As expected, we find that support for government involvement and governance quality have an independent positive effect on citizen support for quotas ($p < 0.001$), lending support for H1 and H3. These findings are consistent with our theory that both political values and heuristic information derive from institutional credibility are important determinants of quota support. Moreover, as the literature predicts, self-interest, as measured by sex, also influences citizen support for gender quotas, with women expressing higher support than men.¹²

Models 3 and 4 in Table 1 present the results associated with our interactive hypotheses (H2 and H4-H6). Given that testing these hypotheses requires taking into account a series of interactions between three variables (*Sex*, *Support for Government Involvement*, and *Governance Quality*), we evaluate each hypothesis based on the fully specified model that includes the three-way interaction and all lower order constitutive terms.

¹²We also find that citizens who have strong beliefs about democracy being the best form of government, who display gender egalitarian attitudes, who place themselves on the Left (i.e., 1-3) of the left-right Ideology scale, and who perceive that the incumbent administration is doing a good job show higher levels of support for quotas. SES and demographic factors, however, do not exert a strong effect.

Table 1: The Determinants of Support for Gender Quotas

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Sex (Female=1; Male=0)	0.362*** (0.028)	0.355*** (0.028)	1.068** (0.351)	1.049** (0.365)
Support for Government Involvement	0.366*** (0.013)	0.373*** (0.012)	0.369*** (0.044)	0.382*** (0.047)
Governance Quality (Gov. Capabilities Index)	0.317*** (0.035)	0.389*** (0.039)	0.537** (0.171)	0.623*** (0.182)
Sex x Support for Gov. Involvement			-0.082 (0.063)	-0.080 (0.065)
Sex x Governance Quality			-0.779** (0.237)	-0.755** (0.248)
Governance Quality x Support for Gov. Involvement			-0.022 (0.029)	-0.025 (0.031)
Sex x Governance Quality x Supp. Gov. Involvement			0.105* (0.042)	0.102* (0.044)
<i>Country Level Controls</i>				
Quota Index	0.185*** (0.012)	0.084*** (0.011)	0.075*** (0.012)	0.084*** (0.011)
GNI per capita	-1.757*** (0.184)	-0.718*** (0.184)	-1.722*** (0.213)	-0.682*** (0.185)
Democracy Level (Partly Free=1; Free=0)		0.197*** (0.037)		0.203*** (0.037)
<i>Individual Level Controls</i>				
Left (Ideology 1-3 =1; 8-10=0)	0.116* (0.045)	0.103* (0.045)	0.111* (0.045)	0.104* (0.045)
Center (Ideology 4-5=1; 8-10=0)	-0.010 (0.041)	-0.016 (0.041)	-0.010 (0.041)	-0.012 (0.041)
Right (Ideology 6-7=1; 8-10=0)	-0.041 (0.044)	-0.032 (0.044)	-0.035 (0.045)	-0.027 (0.044)
Ideology Non-Response (=1; 8-10=0)	-0.032 (0.046)	-0.033 (0.046)	-0.034 (0.046)	-0.027 (0.046)
Support for Democracy	0.094*** (0.009)	0.093*** (0.009)	0.092*** (0.009)	0.093*** (0.009)
Gender Egalitarian Attitudes	0.021** (0.007)	0.018** (0.007)	0.021** (0.007)	0.019** (0.007)
Perceptions of Incumbent Gov. Performance	0.031** (0.010)	0.035*** (0.010)	0.032** (0.010)	0.035*** (0.010)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.017+ (0.010)	0.019+ (0.010)	0.019+ (0.010)	0.020+ (0.010)
Education Level	0.027 (0.022)	0.017 (0.022)	0.028 (0.022)	0.017 (0.022)
Rural (=1; Urban=0)	-0.057+ (0.031)	-0.053+ (0.031)	-0.054+ (0.031)	-0.052+ (0.031)
Married or Common Law marriage (=1; Single=0)	-0.016 (0.034)	-0.006 (0.034)	-0.008 (0.034)	-0.003 (0.034)
Divorced, Separated, or Widowed (=1; Single=0)	-0.109* (0.055)	-0.093+ (0.055)	-0.099+ (0.055)	-0.086 (0.055)
Number of Children	0.002 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)
Age	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Respondents [Countries]	17,083 [24]	17,083 [24]	17,083 [24]	17,083 [24]


+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001. (Std. Errors). Multilevel ordered logit models with random intercepts.

The positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with the three-way interaction term lends preliminary support for our integrative theory, indicating that the effect of each of the three variables on support for quotas is conditional on the others. As Kam and Freeze (2007) point out, however, the signs and statistical significance of interactions and their constituent terms can be difficult to interpret, especially in nonlinear models. Indeed, interaction and constitutive terms lack meaning on their own. We therefore follow the recommendation of Brambor et al. (2006) to present substantive effects and their confidence intervals graphically. Toward that end, we focus on the predicted probabilities generated from estimates of Model 4 in Table 1. Specifically, we estimate mean predicted probabilities taking into account the information for each individual in our sample across all the independent variables included in our models.¹³

We display graphically the average predicted probability of having the highest level of support for quotas, namely a level of 7 on the 1-7 scale. Panels A and B in Figure 2 evaluate graphically H1 and H2, respectively. As H1 predicts, we find that, other things being equal, there is a strong positive relationship between support for government involvement and support for gender quotas (Panel A in Figure 2). Yet, as H2 suggests, this finding is more nuanced. Women are more likely to favor gender quotas than men when support for government involvement is high. As shown in Panel B, at the lowest level of support for government involvement, men and women have a similar probability of supporting quotas—about 11%. When support for government involvement is at its highest level (7 on a 7-point scale), however, a significant gender gap emerges: women are about 10 percentage points more likely than men to express high support for quotas, at 58.4% versus 48.0%, respectively.


¹³Predicted probabilities were computed using the command “margins” in Stata 13.1.

Figure 2. Effect of Preferences for Government Involvement



As shown by Panels A and B of Figure 3, H3 and H4 are also supported by the data. Consistent with H3, we find that governance quality significantly increases support for quotas on average (Panel A), but also, consistent with H4, the size of this effect varies between men and women (Panel B). More specifically, Panel A demonstrates a strong substantive effect of governance quality, where the probability of strongly supporting quotas is 32.8% for countries with the lowest level of governance quality, but rises almost 20 percentage points to 51.1% for countries with the highest level of governance quality.

Figure 3. Effect of Governance Quality




Moreover, Panel B in Figure 3 shows that for countries like Haiti at the lowest end of the Government Capabilities Index, the average probability of expressing high support for quotas is 27.9% and 38.8% among men and women, respectively, a difference of more than 10%. Yet, at the highest level of the Government Capabilities Index, the gender gap effectively vanishes, with the probability of having high support for quotas at 49.4% for men and 54.0% for women. Consistent with H4, this finding demonstrates that in countries with much lower governance quality, men have more reasons for opposing gender quotas than women. Not only are men less likely to perceive such programs as being in their self-interest, but also the poor track record of their government in implementing policies effectively erodes support for quotas.

Next, we evaluate H5, which posits that the effect of support for government involvement on quota support is stronger among individuals who live in countries with a better track record of governance quality than in countries with a poor track record. Figure 4 Panel A and B displays the effect of support for government involvement on quota support among individuals who live in a country with poor governance quality (a score lower than one) and good governance quality (a score higher than two), respectively.¹⁴ The patterns observed in Figure 4 provide strong support for H5. Among citizens who live in countries with poor governance quality (Panel A), the probability of having high support for quotas increases from 10.4% to 49.3% as one moves from the lowest to the highest level of support for government involvement, resulting in an increase in quota support of 38.9%. By comparison, among citizens who live in countries with good governance quality (Panel B), moving from the lowest to the highest levels of support for government involvement results in a significantly larger increase (47.3%) in quota support.

¹⁴An alternative graphical representation of this result is presented in Figure A5. This figure is also reproduced for our alternative measure of governance quality (the Government Effectiveness Index) in Figure A6.

Figure 4. Effect of Governance Quality by Support for Government Involvement




In the last part of our analysis, we test the hypothesis that countries with a better track record of governance quality will show an overall higher level of citizen support for state-mandated gender quota policies—particularly among citizens with high support for government involvement—and a smaller overall gender gap (H6). Figure 5 shows how the positive and significant three-way interaction in Table 1 translates into support for H6. Panel A presents the effects of preferences for government involvement on quota support in countries in our sample with relatively low governance quality (i.e., with a score lower than 1 on the Government Capabilities Index), and Panel B graphs this relationship for countries with high governance quality (i.e., with a score higher than 2 on the index). As Panel B plainly shows, consistent with H6, the effects of governance quality on quota support depend on both support for government involvement and gender. Not only is the overall level of support for quotas higher, but also the overall gender gap in support for quotas is smaller, in countries with good governance quality (Panel A) than in countries with poor governance (Panel B).

Specifically, the overall probability of having high support for quotas is 9.9% higher in countries with good governance quality than in countries with poor governance, and this effect is

primarily driven by individuals who strongly support government involvement. Furthermore, the overall gender gap in support for quotas is half the size in countries with good governance than in countries with poor governance—shrinking from 10.4% to 5.2%. The gap diminishes in Panel B due to the much stronger effect of good governance quality on men’s support for gender quotas than on women’s support.

Figure 5. Effect of Governance Quality by Sex and Preferences for Gov. Involvement



Further Robustness Checks: Testing Alternative Mechanisms

The positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with *Quota Index* in Table 1 indicates that citizens in countries with an effective quota law express stronger support for gender quotas. This suggests that in addition to governance quality, individuals living in countries with effective quota laws may also use heuristic information derived from quota laws to form opinions about state-mandated gender quotas. Indeed, research suggests that whether people form a positive or negative opinion regarding a given policy also depends on how well the policy is designed and implemented (Campbell 2012). According to this perspective, policy implementation carries “informational content” that serves as a cue to citizens when deciding their support for that policy (Pierson 1993, 619). Actual experience with quota implementation may then affect quota support in

ways similar to the ones we hypothesize governance quality will impact quota support. Effective quota laws might nurture public support for quotas, particularly among individuals who strongly support government involvement, and also reduce the gender gap. To evaluate the predictive power of our theory on governance quality relative to the plausible effect of quota implementation, we add a three-way interaction between *Quota Index*, *Support for Government Involvement*, and *Sex* to the model specification in Table 1. We present the results of this analysis in Model 1 in Table C1 in the Online Appendix.

The results from this new model specification show that all of the coefficients associated with the terms used to test H1-H6 are comparable to those in Table 1. We observe that these coefficients are in the same direction, have remarkably similar magnitudes, and show the same levels of statistical significance, indicating that the results presented in Table 1 are robust to this new model specification. Additionally, the coefficient associated with the three-way interaction between *Quota Index*, *Support for Government Involvement*, and *Sex* is not statistically significant ($p=0.217$) (Model 1 Table C1).¹⁵

The effectiveness of quota laws in a given country can, however, also impact support for quotas through two other mechanisms. For one, it may be that the effect of governance quality on quota support is reinforced by the implementation of effective quotas. Alternatively, it may be that citizens in countries without quotas are more likely to use heuristic information derived

¹⁵ Given that this three-way interaction is not statistically significant, we re-estimate the model without this term. Once again we find that the results support all our hypotheses (H1-H6). The results of this new model estimation also show a negative and significant relationship between *Quota Index* and *Sex* and a positive and significant relationship between *Quota Index* and *Support for Government Involvement* (Model 2 Table C1). To further investigate these findings, we graph and explain these results in Figures C1 to C2 in the Online Appendix. The effects associated with the quota index are much smaller than the conditional effects of general governance effectiveness and, as noted, do not compromise in any way the robust effects described thus far.

from general governance quality, whereas in countries with quotas citizens rely more on information derived from quota design. We tested these two possibilities by adding an interaction between *Governance Quality* and *Quota Index* to Model 1 in Table 1 and present the estimates in Table C2 of the Online Appendix.

We find that the results presented in Table 1 are also robust to this model specification. Once again, we find that the signs, magnitudes, and statistical significance of the coefficients that test our integrative theory remain virtually unchanged when we add this interaction term. We do, however, find a negative and significant interaction term between *Governance Quality* and *Quota Index* ($p < .05$), indicating that the effectiveness of quota laws do moderate the relationship between governance quality and citizen support for quotas. To evaluate the direction and magnitude of this effect, we graph the predicted probability of strongly supporting quotas across the entire range of the Government Capabilities Index for countries without a quota (Quota Index = 0) and countries with the most effective quotas (Quota Index = 3). We present these results graphically in the Online Appendix (Figure C3).

We observe that a better track record of governance quality is associated with a higher overall level of support for quotas in countries with and without quotas, but that the effect of governance quality is slightly stronger in countries without quotas. As one moves from countries with the lowest to the highest governance quality, the increase in quota support is only four percentage points higher in countries without quotas than in countries with the most effective quotas. This weak moderating effect does not change our overall conclusion regarding the importance of governance quality. The relationship between good governance and support for quotas is strong and positive, regardless of the implementation or design of gender quotas. In short, individuals are not relying on governance quality as a heuristic only in the absence of quotas.

Conclusions

Our theoretical framework and findings provide a new lens for examining the determinants of citizen support for gender quotas, in particular, as well as support for other affirmative action policies and state-led initiatives aimed at improving democracy more generally. Specifically, our theory and findings on support for gender quotas can guide future research to identify how governance quality impacts citizen support for other policies. Our study provides a systematic analysis of how governance quality, individual traits, and political values shape citizen support for gender quotas across 24 countries, making it the most comprehensive study of its kind. We conclude by briefly describing our main findings and discussing their policy implications as well as their relevance for the study of citizen support for other state-led initiatives.

The first finding to emerge from our research is that citizens' normative beliefs about the role of government in society are important determinants of support for quota policies, independent of other individual level factors such as self-interest, gender egalitarian attitudes, and ideology. Individuals who strongly support government action in the improvement of citizens' wellbeing are more likely to support gender quotas. Moreover, consistent with our expectations, high support for government involvement results in stronger quota support among women than men—most likely because women are more prone than men to attribute gender disparities to unfair treatment rather than to women's decisions.

Further, citizens also rely on heuristic information they draw on from their national context to determine their level of quota support. A government's track record of governance quality serves as a cue to citizens trying to decide their level of quota support, and men are more inclined to resort to this contextual information than women. Consequently, government credibility exerts a stronger positive impact on men's support for quotas than women's. In addition, the effect of good governance is strongest among citizens who favor government involvement. In the end, our results

indicate that, compared to countries with poor governance, countries with a track record of good governance quality display higher levels of citizen support for quotas—particularly among those who strongly support government involvement—and a smaller overall gender gap in quota support.

The stronger effect of governance quality on quota support among men than women suggests that good governance may also narrow the gender gap in citizen support for other gender equality policies such as fair pay and equal access to employment. Beyond gender issues, governance quality can play a role in shaping support for other affirmative action policies currently topping the agendas of political elites and international organizations such as state-mandated quotas (or reserved seats) for ethnic and religious minorities in political decision-making bodies. Latin American countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela have all adopted ethnic quotas. Quotas for minorities have also been adopted in other socially and ethnically diverse countries across the globe (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2014; Krook and O’Brien 2010). Consequently, although political values such as support for government involvement may help explain attitude formation for policies intended to improve the lives of marginalized citizens, support for affirmative action policies in general is likely to be highest in countries with good governance.

In addition to engendering support for affirmative action policies, government capacity has the potential to also impact attitude formation towards other state-led initiatives, such as institutional or electoral reforms, that are salient in Latin American countries and other newly established democracies. In recent years, several Latin American countries have undergone a number of institutional reforms, including government decentralization and electoral reforms such as new ballot designs and state-mandated primary elections. Our research suggests that if states demonstrate weak capacity to govern, it is unlikely that institutional and electoral reforms will be highly supported by the citizenry.

We conclude by highlighting the policy implications of our results. Our findings suggest that

investments in strengthening state capacity can nurture political legitimacy by increasing citizen support for gender quota policies. Ultimately, high support for quotas can serve to pressure political elites to adopt, maintain, and strengthen gender quota laws and thus guarantee their continued success. Hence, our findings stress the importance of organizations devoted to improving governance quality across the globe. Well-performing governments are fundamental for achieving citizen support for public policies to reduce gender inequalities, and thus for promoting representative democracies. Good governance can aid in the building of stronger democracies by enhancing citizen support for policies that provide women with more opportunities to be part of their country's economic, social, and political life.

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Online Appendix

Manuscript title: Making Space for Women: Explaining Citizen Support for Legislative Gender Quotas in Latin America

Table of Contents

Appendix A Variable Descriptions and Robustness Tests 3

- Table A1. Description and Coding of Individual Variables 4
- Table A2. Description and Coding of Country Level Variables 6
- Table A3 Descriptive Statistics of Individual and Country Level Variables 7
- Table A4. Factor Analysis: Support for Government Involvement 8
- Table A5. Factor Analysis: Perception of Government Performance Index 8
- Table A6. Gender Quotas across Latin America as of 2011 9
- Table A7. Support for Gender Quotas (based on Government Effectiveness Index) 10
- Figure A1. Effect of Preferences for Government Involvement (based on Government Effectiveness Index) 11
- Figure A2. Effect of Governance Quality by Sex (based on Government Effectiveness Index) 12
- Figure A3. Effect of Preferences for Gov. Involvement in High and Low Governance Quality Countries (based on Government Effectiveness Index) 13
- Figure A4. Effect of Preferences for Gov. Involvement by Sex in High and Low Governance Quality Countries (based on Government Effectiveness Index) 14
- Table A8. Support for Gender Quotas (controlling for percent of women in the legislature or years since the implementation of quota laws, instead of gender quota index) 15
- Table A9. Support for Gender Quotas (controlling for an alternative measure of democracy, Polity) 16
- Table A10. Support for Gender Quotas (controlling for level of corruption) 17
- Table A11. Support for Gender Quotas (controlling for an alternative measure of gender egalitarian attitudes: “Men Better Political Leaders than Women”) 18
- Table A12. Support for Gender Quotas (controlling for an alternative measure of gender egalitarian attitudes: “If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?”) 19
- Figure A5. Effect of Governance Quality by Support for Government Involvement 20
- Figure A6. Effect of Governance Quality by Support for Government Involvement (based on Government Effectiveness Index) 21

Appendix B Index Description 22

- Description of the Government Capabilities Index 23
- Description of the Government Effectiveness Index 25

Appendix C Further Analysis 26

- Table C1. Support for Gender Quotas (Interacting Quota Index, Support for Government Involvement, and Sex) 27
- Figure C1. The Effect of Quotas by Sex 28
- Figure C2. Effect of Preferences for Gov. Involvement in Countries With and Without Quotas 29
- Table C2. Support for Gender Quotas (Interacting Government Capability index with Quota index) 30
- Figure C3. The effect of Governance Quality by Quota Effectiveness 31

APPENDIX A
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS

Table A1. Description and Coding of Individual Variables

Individual Level Variables	Wording and Coding
Support for Government Involvement	<p>Index computed based on the following items: Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same ladder from 1 to 7.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. 2. The government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. 3. The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. 4. The government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services
Ideology	<p>On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.</p> <p>This variable was recoded as follows: 0= Non-Response 1-3=1 4-5=2 6-7=3 8-10=4</p>
Perceptions of Gov. Performance	<p>Index computed based on the following items: On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. Using this ladder,</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To what extent would you say the current administration fights poverty? 2. To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles? 3. To what extent would you say the current administration combats government corruption? 4. To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety?
Support for Democracy	<p>Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? (scale 1-7; 1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree)</p>
Gender Egalitarian Attitudes	<p>Some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree? (scale 1-7; 1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree)</p> <p><i>Alternative Measures:</i> If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter? Dummy variables were created for each category where "it does not matter" is the reference category.</p> <p>Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree</p>
Female	<p>Male=0; Female=1</p>
Household Wealth	<p>Quintiles of household wealth computed based on Principal Component Analysis and 12 household assets: Television, Refrigerator, Landline/residential telephone, Cellular telephone, Vehicle, Washing machine, Microwave oven, Motorcycle, Indoor plumbing, Indoor bathroom, Computer, Internet, and Flat panel TV. The methodology followed is described in Córdova, Abby B. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative</p>

Individual Level Variables	Wording and Coding
	Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators.” AmericasBarometer Insights series. Retrieved from http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights2009.php .
Education	Level of education: 1) None 2) At least some primary 3) At least some secondary, or 4) At least some university
Urban	Rural=0; Urban=1
Marital Status	What is your marital status? 1) Single, 2) Married, 3) Common law marriage, 4) Divorced, 5) Separated, or 6) Widowed Recoded as follows: 1-Single, 2- Married or Common law marriage, 3- Divorced, Separated, or Widowed.
Number of Children	Do you have children? How many?
Age	Age in years estimated using the following item: On what day, month and year were you born?

Table A2. Description and Coding of Country Level Variables

Country Level Variables	Wording and Coding
Quota Index	The index is comprised of three factors: 1) the existence of a state-mandated gender quota, 2) the use of placement mandates, and 3) the use of enforcement mechanisms. It ranges from 0 (no quota) to 3 (quotas with placement mandate and enforcement mechanisms). Data are from the Global Database of Quotas for Women by the International Institute of Electoral Democracy and Assistance (IDEA), Stockholm University (Retrieved July 5, 2014, from http://www.quotaproject.org/), and Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) (Retrieved June 21, 2014, from http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world-arc.htm). All of the data for gender quota policies correspond to laws that were adopted and implemented in an election prior January 2012 (thus prior to the LAPOP survey).
Women in Parliament	Share of women in the national parliament the year prior to the LAPOP survey. Data are from the Women in National Parliament statistical archives compiled by the Inter-Parliamentary Union.
Years since Gender Quota Adoption	Authors' calculation based on data from the Global Database of Quotas for Women by the International Institute of Electoral Democracy and Assistance (IDEA).
Government Capabilities Index	Data are from the Political Institutions, Government Capabilities, and Public Policy International Dataset by the Inter-American Development Bank.
Government Effectiveness Index	Data are from the World Bank's Governance Indicators for 2011. The original scale of the index includes negative values. Since Stata 13.1 does not allow the use of the margins commands with negative values, we recoded this variable in a scale from .347 to 3.256 by adding a value of 2 to the original scale. This allows us to have a variable without negative numbers and be able to graph our results.
GNI per capita Index	Data are from the United Nations Development Program. The index ranks countries based on their Gross National Income per capita Index on a scale from 0 to 1.
Corruption	Data from the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. Countries are ranked based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be by observers from around the world and experts in the countries evaluated. The index ranges between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (highly clean). We use the CPI variable from the Political Institutions, Government Capabilities, and Public Policy International Dataset by the Inter-American Development Bank, which averages this data from 1995-2012. The data for the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index were gathered in the 24 months preceding the publication date. As such data from 2012 reflect corruption perceptions from 2010 and 2011.
Democracy Level (Freedom House)	Data from Freedom House International corresponding to 2011. Countries classified as "partly free" are coded 1. "Free" countries are coded 0.
Democracy Level (Polity)	Data from Polity IV corresponding to 2011.

Table A3. Descriptive Statistics of Individual and Country Level Variables

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
<i>Individual Level Variables</i>				
Support for Gender Quotas	4.948	1.915	1	7
Support for Government Involvement	5.794	1.210	1	7
Left (Ideology 1-3)	0.188	0.391	0	1
Center (Ideology 4-5)	0.265	0.441	0	1
Right (Ideology 6-7)	0.178	0.383	0	1
Far Right (Ideology 8-10)	0.204	.403	0	1
Ideology Non-Response	0.165	0.371	0	1
Perceptions of Incumbent Gov. Performance	3.802	1.499	1	7
Support for Democracy	5.259	1.721	1	7
Gender Egalitarian Attitudes	3.325	2.117	1	7
Female	0.456	0.498	0	1
Household Wealth	2.972	1.423	1	5
Education	1.867	0.757	0	3
Rural	0.340	0.474	0	1
Single	.325	.468	0	1
Married or with Partner	0.574	0.495	0	1
Separated, Divorce, Widowed	0.101	0.301	0	1
Number of Children	2.062	2.117	0	25
Age	39.623	15.845	16	106
<i>Country Level Variables</i>				
Government Capabilities Index	1.40	0.52	0.34	2.39
Government Effectiveness Index	-.275	.623	-1.653	1.256
Quota Index	1.182	1.291	0.00	3.00
% Women in Parliament	19.258	9.548	0.00	38.60
Years since gender quota adoption	6.649	6.612	0	18
GNI per capita Index	0.61	0.10	0.35	0.80
Freedom House	0.458	0.498	0	1
Polity	7.050	3.153	-3.000	10
Level of Corruption	3.325	1.168	1.772	7.139

Table A4. Factor Analysis: Support for Government Involvement

Question Wording	Factor I	Uniqueness
1. The government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people.	0.7902	0.3756
2. The government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs.	0.8225	0.3236
3. The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor.	0.7646	0.4154
4. The government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services	0.8105	0.3431

Method: Principal-Component Factors; Rotation: Orthogonal Varimax
Proportion of Variance Explained by Factor I=64%
Cronbach's alpha coefficient=0.81

Table A5. Factor Analysis: Perception of Government Performance Index

Question Wording	Factor I	Uniqueness
1. To what extent would you say the current administration fights poverty?	0.8513	0.2752
2. To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles?	0.8660	0.2500
3. To what extent would you say the current administration combats government corruption?	0.8650	0.2518
4. To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety?	0.8508	0.2762

Method: Principal-Component Factors; Rotation: Orthogonal Varimax
Proportion of Variance Explained by Factor I=74%
Cronbach's alpha coefficient=0.88

Table A6. Gender Quotas across Latin America as of 2011

Country	Gender Quota	Year Implemented	Placement Mandate	Enforcement Mechanisms	Quota Index	Women in Parliament
Costa Rica	Yes	1998	Yes	Yes	3	38.6
Argentina	Yes	1993	Yes	Yes	3	38.5
Ecuador	Yes	1998	Yes	Yes	3	32.3
Mexico	Yes	1997	Yes	Yes	3	26.2
Bolivia	Yes	1997	Yes	Yes	3	25.4
Dominican Republic	Yes	1998	Yes	Yes	3	20.8
Guyana	Yes	2001	No	Yes	2	30.0
Peru	Yes	2000	No	Yes	2	27.5
Paraguay	Yes	1998	No	Yes	2	12.5
Honduras	Yes	2001	No	No	1	18.0
Brazil	Yes	1998	No	No	1	8.6
Panama	Yes	1999	No	No	1	8.5
Trinidad & Tobago	No	NA	NA	NA	0	28.6
Nicaragua	No	NA	NA	NA	0	20.7
El Salvador	No	NA	NA	NA	0	19
Venezuela	No	NA	NA	NA	0	17
Chile	No	NA	NA	NA	0	14.2
Guatemala	No	NA	NA	NA	0	13.3
Colombia	No	NA	NA	NA	0	13.3
Uruguay	No	NA	NA	NA	0	12.7
Jamaica	No	NA	NA	NA	0	12.0
Haiti	No	NA	NA	NA	0	11.2
Suriname	No	NA	NA	NA	0	9.8
Belize	No	NA	NA	NA	0	0

Note: All of the data for quota policies correspond to laws that were adopted and implemented in a national election prior January 2011. Year implemented indicates the first year in which the quota was implemented in a national parliamentary election.


Source: Data compiled by the Global Database of Quotas for Women by International IDEA, Stockholm University and Inter-Parliamentary Union. Available at: <http://www.quotaproject.org>. All of the data for gender quota policies correspond to laws that were adopted and implemented in an election prior January 2011 (thus prior to the LAPOP survey). Women in Parliament was collected from Women in National Parliament statistical archives compiled by the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Data was measured in January 2011. Available at: <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif310111.htm>.

Table A7. Support for Gender Quotas (based on Government Effectiveness Index)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Sex (Female=1; Male=0)	0.345*** (0.028)	0.346*** (0.028)	1.291*** (0.376)	1.260*** (0.375)
Support for Government Involvement	0.370*** (0.012)	0.370*** (0.012)	0.326*** (0.049)	0.339*** (0.048)
Governance Quality (Gov. Effectiveness Index)	0.169*** (0.033)	0.173*** (0.035)	0.188 (0.160)	0.293+ (0.159)
Sex x Support for Gov. Involvement			-0.123+ (0.067)	-0.119+ (0.067)
Sex x Governance Quality			-0.771*** (0.213)	-0.759*** (0.213)
Governance Quality x Support for Gov. Involvement			0.008 (0.028)	0.001 (0.027)
Sex x Governance Quality x Supp. Gov. Involvement			0.111** (0.038)	0.108** (0.038)
<i>Country Level Controls</i>				
Quota Index	0.102*** (0.011)	0.101*** (0.011)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.158*** (0.011)
GNI per capita	-0.849*** (0.203)	-0.839*** (0.205)	-1.274*** (0.205)	-1.652*** (0.208)
Democracy Level (Partly Free=1; Free=0)		0.013 (0.036)		0.034 (0.036)
<i>Individual Level Controls</i>				
Left (Ideology 1-3 =1; 8-10=0)	0.119** (0.045)	0.119** (0.045)	0.129** (0.045)	0.115* (0.045)
Center (Ideology 4-5=1; 8-10=0)	-0.009 (0.041)	-0.010 (0.041)	-0.006 (0.041)	-0.019 (0.041)
Right (Ideology 6-7=1; 8-10=0)	-0.028 (0.044)	-0.028 (0.044)	-0.044 (0.045)	-0.049 (0.044)
Ideology Non-Response (=1; 8-10=0)	-0.025 (0.046)	-0.025 (0.046)	-0.035 (0.046)	-0.054 (0.046)
Support for Democracy	0.094*** (0.009)	0.094*** (0.009)	0.094*** (0.009)	0.095*** (0.009)
Gender Egalitarian Attitudes	0.017* (0.007)	0.017* (0.007)	0.024*** (0.007)	0.021** (0.007)
Perceptions of Incumbent Gov. Performance	0.034*** (0.010)	0.034*** (0.010)	0.034*** (0.010)	0.035*** (0.010)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.024* (0.010)	0.024* (0.010)	0.019+ (0.010)	0.019+ (0.010)
Education Level	-0.004 (0.022)	-0.003 (0.022)	0.032 (0.022)	0.025 (0.022)
Rural (=1; Urban=0)	-0.056+ (0.031)	-0.055+ (0.031)	-0.062* (0.031)	-0.056+ (0.031)
Married or Common Law marriage (=1; Single=0)	-0.014 (0.034)	-0.014 (0.034)	-0.013 (0.034)	-0.013 (0.034)
Divorced, Separated, or Widowed (=1; Single=0)	-0.099+ (0.055)	-0.099+ (0.055)	-0.093+ (0.055)	-0.102+ (0.055)
Number of Children	0.005 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)
Age	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Respondents [Countries]	17,083 [24]	17,083 [24]	17,083 [24]	17,083 [24]

+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001. (Std. Errors). Multilevel ordered logit models with random intercepts.

**Figure A1. Effect of Preferences for Government Involvement
(based on Government Effectiveness Index)**



**Figure A2. Effect of Governance Quality by Sex
(based on Government Effectiveness Index)**






Figure A3. Effect of Preferences for Gov. Involvement in High and Low Governance Quality Countries (based on Government Effectiveness Index)



Countries with low or high government effectiveness correspond to those with a value lower than -.699 or higher than .316 on the Government Effectiveness Index. These thresholds were chosen to make these graphs comparable to those based on the Government Capability Index presented in the manuscript. The same countries are classified as low or high performance based on both indexes.

Figure A4. Effect of Preferences for Gov. Involvement by Sex in High and Low Governance Quality Countries (based on Government Effectiveness Index)



Countries with low or high government effectiveness correspond to those with a value lower than .699 or higher than .316 on the Government Effectiveness Index. These thresholds were chosen to make these graphs comparable to those based on the Government Capability Index presented in the manuscript. The same countries are classified as low or high performance based on both indexes.

Table A8. Support for Gender Quotas (controlling for percent of women in the legislature or years since the implementation of quota laws, instead of gender quota index)

	Model 1	Model 2
Sex (Female=1; Male=0)	1.077** (0.351)	1.147** (0.352)
Support for Government Involvement	0.406*** (0.044)	0.370*** (0.045)
Governance Quality (Gov. Capabilities Index)	0.552** (0.173)	1.069*** (0.176)
Sex x Support for Gov. Involvement	-0.095 (0.063)	-0.102 (0.063)
Sex x Governance Quality	-0.782** (0.239)	-0.830*** (0.239)
Governance Quality x Support for Gov. Involvement	-0.043 (0.030)	-0.022 (0.030)
Sex x Governance Quality x Supp. Gov. Involvement	0.113** (0.042)	0.120** (0.042)
<i>Country Level Controls</i>		
Percent Women in Legislature	0.015*** (0.002)	
Years since Quota Implementation		0.010*** (0.002)
GNI per capita	-0.512** (0.196)	-1.680*** (0.190)
Democracy Level (Partly Free=1; Free=0)	0.196*** (0.040)	0.194*** (0.037)
<i>Individual Level Controls</i>		
Left (Ideology 1-3 =1; 8-10=0)	0.112* (0.045)	0.136** (0.045)
Center (Ideology 4-5=1; 8-10=0)	-0.007 (0.041)	0.000 (0.041)
Right (Ideology 6-7=1; 8-10=0)	-0.029 (0.044)	-0.038 (0.044)
Ideology Non-Response (=1; 8-10=0)	-0.020 (0.047)	-0.039 (0.046)
Support for Democracy	0.090*** (0.009)	0.105*** (0.009)
Gender Egalitarian Attitudes	0.021** (0.007)	0.023** (0.007)
Perceptions of Incumbent Gov. Performance	0.035*** (0.010)	0.033*** (0.010)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.023* (0.010)	0.018+ (0.010)
Education Level	0.012 (0.022)	0.030 (0.022)
Rural (=1; Urban=0)	-0.043 (0.031)	-0.078* (0.031)
Married or Common Law marriage (=1; Single=0)	-0.003 (0.034)	-0.017 (0.034)
Divorced, Separated, or Widowed (=1; Single=0)	-0.090 (0.055)	-0.097+ (0.055)
Number of Children	0.005 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)
Age	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Respondents [Countries]	17,083[24]	17,083[24]

+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. (Std. Errors). Multilevel ordered logit models with random intercepts. As shown in Table A6, no countries in our sample fall into the five to twelve year range.

Table A9. Support for Gender Quotas (controlling for an alternative measure of democracy, Polity IV)

Sex (Female=1; Male=0)	1.116** (0.367)
Support for Government Involvement	0.377*** (0.047)
Governance Quality (Gov. Capabilities Index)	0.484** (0.188)
Sex x Support for Gov. Involvement	-0.093 (0.065)
Sex x Governance Quality	-0.812** (0.251)
Governance Quality x Support for Gov. Involvement	-0.025 (0.032)
Sex x Governance Quality x Supp. Gov. Involvement	0.114* (0.044)
<i>Country Level Controls</i>	
Quota Index	0.099*** (0.012)
GNI per capita	-1.817*** (0.185)
Democracy Level (Polity)	0.047*** (0.006)
<i>Individual Level Controls</i>	
Left (Ideology 1-3 =1; 8-10=0)	0.124** (0.046)
Center (Ideology 4-5=1; 8-10=0)	-0.008 (0.042)
Right (Ideology 6-7=1; 8-10=0)	-0.027 (0.046)
Ideology Non-Response (=1; 8-10=0)	0.013 (0.047)
Support for Democracy	0.108*** (0.009)
Gender Egalitarian Attitudes	0.020** (0.007)
Perceptions of Incumbent Gov. Performance	0.032** (0.010)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.021* (0.011)
Education Level	-0.006 (0.022)
Rural (=1; Urban=0)	-0.080* (0.031)
Married or Common Law marriage (=1; Single=0)	-0.014 (0.034)
Divorced, Separated, or Widowed (=1; Single=0)	-0.099+ (0.056)
Number of Children	0.002 (0.008)
Age	0.000 (0.001)
Respondents [Countries]	16,390 [23]

+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001. (Std. Errors). Multilevel ordered logit models with random intercepts. There are only 23 countries in this analysis because Polity does not include Belize in their sample.

Table A10. Support for Gender Quotas (controlling for level of corruption)

Sex (Female=1; Male=0)	1.072** (0.352)
Support for Government Involvement	0.426*** (0.044)
Governance Quality (Gov. Capabilities Index)	0.470** (0.173)
Sex x Support for Gov. Involvement	-0.091 (0.063)
Sex x Governance Quality	-0.804*** (0.238)
Governance Quality x Support for Gov. Involvement	-0.062* (0.029)
Sex x Governance Quality x Supp. Gov. Involvement	0.113** (0.042)
<i>Country Level Controls</i>	
Quota Index	0.156*** (0.012)
GNI per capita	-0.320 (0.198)
Corruption	-0.038+ (0.022)
Democracy Level (Partly Free=1; Free=0)	0.085* (0.039)
<i>Individual Level Controls</i>	
Left (Ideology 1-3 =1; 8-10=0)	0.104* (0.046)
Center (Ideology 4-5=1; 8-10=0)	-0.023 (0.041)
Right (Ideology 6-7=1; 8-10=0)	-0.043 (0.044)
Ideology Non-Response (=1; 8-10=0)	-0.013 (0.047)
Support for Democracy	0.090*** (0.009)
Gender Egalitarian Attitudes	0.018** (0.007)
Perceptions of Incumbent Gov. Performance	0.030** (0.010)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.027* (0.010)
Education Level	-0.009 (0.022)
Rural (=1; Urban=0)	-0.044 (0.031)
Married or Common Law marriage (=1; Single=0)	-0.008 (0.034)
Divorced, Separated, or Widowed (=1; Single=0)	-0.099+ (0.055)
Number of Children	0.004 (0.008)
Age	-0.000 (0.001)
Respondents [Countries]	17,083 [24]

+ p<0.1;* p<0.05;**p<0.01; *** p<0.001. (Std. Errors). Multilevel ordered logit models with random intercepts.

Table A11. Support for Gender Quotas (controlling for an alternative measure of gender egalitarian attitudes: “Men Better Political Leaders than Women”)

Sex (Female=1; Male=0)	0.898** (0.348)
Support for Government Involvement	0.359*** (0.044)
Governance Quality (Gov. Capabilities Index)	0.594*** (0.172)
Sex x Support for Gov. Involvement	-0.069 (0.062)
Sex x Governance Quality	-0.693** (0.236)
Governance Quality x Support for Gov. Involvement	-0.015 (0.030)
Sex x Governance Quality x Supp. Gov. Involvement	0.093* (0.042)
<i>Country Level Controls</i>	
Quota Index	0.202*** (0.015)
GNI per capita	-1.341*** (0.279)
Democracy Level (Partly Free=1; Free=0)	0.459*** (0.052)
<i>Individual Level Controls</i>	
Left (Ideology 1-3 =1; 8-10=0)	0.079+ (0.046)
Center (Ideology 4-5=1; 8-10=0)	-0.031 (0.041)
Right (Ideology 6-7=1; 8-10=0)	-0.054 (0.045)
Ideology Non-Response (=1; 8-10=0)	-0.050 (0.047)
Support for Democracy	0.092*** (0.009)
<i>Men Better Political Leaders than Women</i>	
Strongly Agree (=1; 0=Non-Response)	-0.108 (0.087)
Agree (=1; 0=Non-Response)	0.072 (0.073)
Disagree (=1; 0=Non-Response)	0.303*** (0.069)
Strongly Disagree (=1; 0=Non-Response)	0.439*** (0.073)
Perceptions of Incumbent Gov. Performance	0.040*** (0.010)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.016 (0.010)
Education Level	0.007 (0.022)
Rural (=1; Urban=0)	-0.044 (0.031)
Married or Common Law marriage (=1; Single=0)	-0.015 (0.034)
Divorced, Separated, or Widowed (=1; Single=0)	-0.106+ (0.055)
Number of Children	0.007 (0.008)
Age	-0.000 (0.001)
Respondents [Countries]	17,083 [24]


+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001. (Std. Errors). Multilevel ordered logit models with random intercepts.

Table A12. Support for Gender Quotas (controlling for an alternative measure of gender egalitarian attitudes: “If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?”)

Sex (Female=1; Male=0)	1.092** (0.365)
Support for Government Involvement	0.381*** (0.047)
Governance Quality (Gov. Capabilities Index)	0.598** (0.183)
Sex x Support for Gov. Involvement	-0.097 (0.065)
Sex x Governance Quality	-0.792** (0.236)
Governance Quality x Support for Gov. Involvement	-0.025 (0.031)
Sex x Governance Quality x Supp. Gov. Involvement	0.110* (0.044)
<i>Country Level Controls</i>	
Quota Index	0.083*** (0.011)
GNI per capita	-0.801*** (0.185)
Democracy Level (Partly Free=1; Free=0)	0.166*** (0.037)
<i>Individual Level Controls</i>	
Left (Ideology 1-3 =1; 8-10=0)	0.109* (0.045)
Center (Ideology 4-5=1; 8-10=0)	-0.012 (0.041)
Right (Ideology 6-7=1; 8-10=0)	-0.020 (0.044)
Ideology Non-Response (=1; 8-10=0)	-0.016 (0.046)
Support for Democracy	0.097*** (0.009)
<i>Men vs. Women Running the Economy</i>	
Who would do a better Job? (A woman=1; 0=it does not matter)	0.409*** (0.033)
Who would do a better Job? (A man=1; 0=it does not matter)	-0.053 (0.042)
Who would do a better Job? (Do not know=1; 0=it does not matter)	0.054 (0.063)
Perceptions of Incumbent Gov. Performance	0.039*** (0.010)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.020+ (0.010)
Education Level	0.007 (0.022)
Rural (=1; Urban=0)	-0.036 (0.031)
Married or Common Law marriage (=1; Single=0)	0.003 (0.034)
Divorced, Separated, or Widowed (=1; Single=0)	-0.078 (0.055)
Number of Children	0.000 (0.008)
Age	-0.000 (0.001)
Respondents [Countries]	17,083 [24]


+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001. (Std. Errors). Multilevel ordered logit models with random intercepts.

Figure A5. Effect of Governance Quality by Support for Government Involvement



This figure represents an alternative graphical representation for evaluating H5, which posits that the effect of governance quality on quota support is stronger among individuals who have high support for government involvement. Figure A5 Panel A displays the effect of governance quality on quota support among individuals who report low levels of support for government involvement (a score lower than the mean value=5.794). In Figure A5 Panel B, we present this effect among individuals who report high levels of support for government involvement (with a score higher than the mean value=5.794). The patterns observed in Figure A5 give strong support to H5. Among citizens with low levels of support for government involvement (<5.794), the probability of having high support for quotas increases from 24.9% to 40.8% as one moves from the lowest level of government capabilities to the highest, resulting in increase in quota support of 15.9%. By comparison, among citizens with high levels of support for government involvement, moving from the lowest levels to the highest level of government capabilities results in an increase in quota support from 39.2% to 59.9% (a 20.7% increase). In short, better governance quality is associated with a higher probability of having high support for quotas, but particularly when individuals also have high support for government involvement, indicating support for H5.

**Figure A6. Effect of Governance Quality by Support for Government Involvement
(based on Government Effectiveness Index)**



This is a replication of Figure A5 using the Government Effectiveness Index. This figure shows that the results are also robust to this alternative measure of governance quality.

APPENDIX B

INDEX DESCRIPTION

Description of the Government Capabilities Index

One of the key independent variables in our analysis is the Government Capabilities Index from the Political Institutions, Government Capabilities, and Public Policy International Dataset by the Inter-American Development Bank (Chuaire and Scartascini 2014). The Government Capabilities Index was designed to measure the “*capabilities of polities that affect the ultimate quality of public policy* [emphasis added]” (Stein and Tommasi 2007, 194). It seeks to ascertain the extent to which the government has a proven capacity to effectively develop and implement policies, to maintain the “basic thrust of their policies for long periods of time,” and to adjust rapidly to policy failures (Stein and Tommasi 2007, 194). Given that the measure is designed to assess the durability of policy, the index does not merely measure a snap shot of a government’s performance, but it captures its performance over a long period of time.

According to research conducted by the proponents of the index, the combined performance of four institutions—congress, political parties, judiciary, and bureaucratic apparatus—best explains a country’s ability to design, approve, and implement effective public policies (Stein and Tommasi 2007; Scartascini, Stein, and Tommasi 2008). The Government Capabilities index, thus, takes into account the policy-making capacity of each institution. As research demonstrates that the quality of public policy depends on the full array of these four institutions and how they work together (Stein and Tommasi 2007, 195), a single index based on performance indicators of these institutions better captures a government’s overall capability. Indeed, the coordination between these four key players is important for the successful implementation of public policy (Stein and Tommasi 2007, 195). High values on the index indicate that “political parties are institutionalized and programmatic, legislatures have sound policy-making capabilities, judiciaries are independent, and bureaucrats are strong” (Stein and Tommasi 2007, 193). It is important to note that the index excludes policies related to the adoption of gender quotas, the gender composition of the legislature, or the type of electoral system in place (i.e., that may affect the likelihood of women being elected to office). As such, the implementation of quota laws (or effectiveness gender quotas) does not enter into the construction of this index.

The Government Capabilities Index uses data from a combination of expert assessments and individual-level surveys to determine the policy-making capacity of each institution included in the index. To ensure that the index reflects performance over a long period of time, measures included in each the four components is averaged across several years. The index is calculated based on the average of its respective components. Before calculating the average, all of the variables included in the index were rescaled to range from 1 to 4. The components of the Government Capabilities Index and their corresponding data source are described below.

Components of the Government Capabilities Index

1. Congress Capabilities Index

This component of the index is designed to account for Congress’s ability to bargain and enforce of policy agreements and to facilitate the **development of consensual and consistent policies over time** (Saiegh 2010, Palanza, Scartascini, and Tommasi 2012). This index is comprised of two indicators.

- a. **Legislative efficiency:** Relies on expert surveys from the The Global Information Technology Report- World Economic Forum to assess how effective parliament functions as a law-making institution.
- b. **Confidence in Parliament:** Relies on the Worlds Values Survey to assess how much confidence individuals have in parliament.

2. Party System Institutionalization

This component of the index consists of five elements with are designed to capture how well institutionalized the political party system is. Institutionalized party systems are better positioned to participate in policy debates, fulfill party promises, negotiate with congress, and facilitate

policy compromise.

- a. ***Stable, moderate, rooted party system***: Utilizes the Bertelsmann Transformations Index to assess “the extent to which parties are socially rooted and organizationally institutionalized, the level of polarization, and the degree of voter volatility” (Chuaire and Scartascini 2014, 14).
- b. ***Confidence in Political Parties***: Employs data from the Worlds Values Survey to assess individual confidence in political parties.
- c. ***Vote Volatility***: Using the Pederson (1984) method and election results, “volatility is calculated by subtracting the percentage of the vote/seats won by every party in an election from that won in the previous election, taking the absolute value of this result, summing the results for all parties, and then dividing this total by two” (Chuaire and Scartascini 2014, 14).
- d. ***Party Age***: Using the Database of Political Institutions, this component measures the average age of the two largest government parties and the largest opposition party.
- e. ***Fairness of Elections***: Using expert assessments from Bertelsmann Transformations Index, this indicator assesses the extent to which elections are free and fair.

3. **Judicial Independence**

Judicial independence is important for the enforcement of public policies and to ensure they are constitutional. When the judiciary functions as an independent referee it can enhance the stability of public policies (Scartascini, Stein, and Tommasi 2013). Two variables are used to capture judicial independence.

- a. ***GCR Judicial Independence***: This indicator relies on the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) to evaluate the extent to which the judiciary is independent from influences of members of government, citizens, or firms.
- b. ***BTI Judicial Independence***: This indicator relies on Bertelsmann Transformations Index to assess “whether the judiciary has the ability and autonomy to interpret and review existing laws and policies, pursue its own reasoning, free from the influence of political groups, among other considerations” (Chuaire and Scartascini 2014, 16).

4. **Bureaucracy Index**: An effective bureaucracy is crucial to the proper implementation of public policies and to ensure coordination across ministries. A strong bureaucracy helps to protect public policies against political opportunism, and ensures adaptability of public policies by offering on technical expertise. This measure is based on the following four variables.

- a. ***Bureaucratic Merit Index***: Employs question 14 of the Columbia University State Capacity Survey to assess “which guarantees of professionalism in the civil service are in place and the degree to which civil servants are effectively protected from arbitrariness, politicization, and rent-seeking” (Chuaire and Scartascini 2014, 17).
- b. ***Bureaucratic Functional Capacity Index***: Employs question 13 of the Columbia University State Capacity Survey to assess whether “the bureaucracy has salary compensation systems and systems for evaluating the performance of public officials” (Chuaire and Scartascini 2014, 17).
- c. ***Bureaucratic Efficiency Index***: Employs question 16 of the Columbia University State Capacity Survey to assess which the bureaucracy is efficient in assigning human capital, given a fiscal policy constraint” (Chuari and Scartascini 2013, 23).
- d. ***Bureaucratic Quality Index***: Uses the International Country Risk Guide to measure the strength and expertise of the bureaucracy to govern without severe changes to policy or causing disruptions in government services.

The complete dataset and codebook, including detailed information on each of the components of the Government Capabilities Index (gov_capabilities), can be found here:

http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/publication-details,3169.html?pub_id=IDB-DB-112

(Accessed July 11, 2015).

Description of the Government Effectiveness Index

We also demonstrate that the findings from our analysis are consistent when government performance is measured using the Government Effectiveness Index from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. The Government Effectiveness Index was designed to capture “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010, 4). Similar to the Government Capabilities Index, the Government Effectiveness measure was created by averaging together a number of indicators.

The Government Effectiveness Index uses data from a combination of surveys of households and firms, commercial business information providers, non-governmental organizations, and public sector organizations. Unlike the Government Capabilities Index, the Government Effectiveness Index does not evaluate government performance over a long period of time. Instead, the Worldwide Governance Indicators are produced on an annual basis. Nonetheless, we find that in our sample the Government Capability and Government Effectiveness indices are strongly correlated (0.87, p -value<.0001), suggesting that governance quality in the Latin American region has not change dramatically over the past decade. Components of the index and corresponding data sources are listed below. The methodology used for index construction can be found in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010).

Components of the Government Effectiveness Index

1. The index relies on the Economist Intelligence Unit Riskwire & Democracy Index to examine the quality of bureaucratic institutions, institutional effectiveness, the effectiveness of bureaucracy and bureaucratic red tape.
2. Employs the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report to evaluate infrastructure and the quality of primary education.
3. The indicator utilizes Gallup World Poll to evaluate satisfaction with public transportation, roads and highways, and the education system.
4. Uses expert surveys from Institutional Profiles Database to determine the coverage area of public school, basic health services, drinking water and sanitation, electricity grid, transport infrastructure, maintenance and waste disposal.
5. The index utilizes the Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide to assess bureaucratic quality.
6. Uses expert surveys from Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators to assess the efficiency of bureaucracy and policy consistency.

The complete dataset and codebook, for the Government Effectiveness Index, can be found here: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc-over>. (Accessed July 12, 2015).


APPENDIX C
Further Robustness Checks:
Testing Alternative
Mechanisms

Table C1. Support for Gender Quotas (Interacting Quota Index, Support for Government Involvement, and Sex)
This table compares the results from our further analysis to the results presented in the main analysis in the text.

	Model 1 Further Analysis	Model 2 Further Analysis	Model 3 Original Analysis
Sex (Female=1; Male=0)	1.218*** (0.370)	1.070** (0.357)	1.068** (0.351)
Support for Government Involvement	0.334*** (0.047)	0.324*** (0.047)	0.369*** (0.044)
Governance Quality (Gov. Capabilities Index)	0.498** (0.177)	0.702*** (0.178)	0.537** (0.171)
Sex x Support for Gov. Involvement	-0.099 (0.067)	-0.072 (0.064)	-0.082 (0.063)
Sex x Governance Quality	-0.731** (0.245)	-0.738** (0.243)	-0.779** (0.237)
Governance Quality x Support for Gov. Involvement	-0.017 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.031)	-0.022 (0.029)
Sex x Governance Quality x Supp. Gov. Involvement	0.097* (0.043)	0.099* (0.043)	0.105* (0.042)
Quota Index	-0.021 (0.070)	-0.035 (0.054)	0.075*** (0.012)
Sex x Quota Index	-0.168 (0.104)	-0.047* (0.021)	
Quota Index x Support for Gov. Involvement	0.025* (0.012)	0.029** (0.009)	
Sex x Quota Index x Supp. Gov. Involvement	0.022 (0.018)		
<i>Country Level Controls</i>			
GNI per capita	-1.520*** (0.185)	-3.079*** (0.197)	-1.722*** (0.213)
<i>Individual Level Controls</i>			
Left (Ideology 1-3 =1; 8-10=0)	0.110* (0.045)	0.114* (0.045)	0.111* (0.045)
Center (Ideology 4-5=1; 8-10=0)	-0.021 (0.041)	0.004 (0.041)	-0.010 (0.041)
Right (Ideology 6-7=1; 8-10=0)	-0.042 (0.044)	-0.019 (0.045)	-0.035 (0.045)
Ideology Non-Response (=1; 8-10=0)	-0.046 (0.046)	-0.014 (0.047)	-0.034 (0.046)
Support for Democracy	0.094*** (0.009)	0.091*** (0.009)	0.092*** (0.009)
Gender Egalitarian Attitudes	0.023** (0.007)	0.022** (0.007)	0.021** (0.007)
Perceptions of Gov. Performance	0.029** (0.010)	0.036*** (0.010)	0.032** (0.010)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.019+ (0.010)	0.019+ (0.010)	0.019+ (0.010)
Education Level	0.022 (0.022)	0.025 (0.022)	0.028 (0.022)
Rural (=1; Urban=0)	-0.055+ (0.031)	-0.042 (0.031)	-0.054+ (0.031)
Married or Common Law marriage (=1; Single=0)	-0.011 (0.034)	-0.006 (0.034)	-0.008 (0.034)
Divorced, Separated, or Widowed (=1; Single=0)	-0.093+ (0.055)	-0.094+ (0.055)	-0.099+ (0.055)
Number of Children	0.003 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)
Age	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Respondents [Countries]	17,083[24]	17,083[24]	17,083[24]

+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001. (Std. Errors). Multilevel ordered logit models with random intercepts.

Figure C1. The Effect of Quotas by Sex



Although having an effective quota law does increase the probability that citizens will show support for quota policies on average, we find that quota effectiveness does not have a substantially larger impact on men's than women's quota support. As we move from the lowest level on the quota index to the highest level, men's support for quotas increases only by 1.7 percentage points more than the increase in women's support, indicating that, unlike governance quality, the *Quota Index* does not exert a strong effect on men's support for gender quotas than on women's (Figure C1). Next, the effect of support for gender quotas is higher in countries that have implemented the most effective quota laws, particularly among citizens who strongly support government involvement. Specifically, we observe that the probability of strongly supporting quotas among individuals with the highest level of support for government involvement is 33% in countries with no quota and 38% in countries with a quota—a 5 percent increase (Figure C2 in the next page). In contrast, the effect of moving from a country with poor governance quality to a country with good governance is twice the size (i.e., 10 percent, see Figure 4 in the manuscript). In sum, the impact of well-designed quotas laws is relatively constant for men and women and, in comparison to governance quality, results in a smaller increase in the level of support for quotas among individuals who strongly support government involvement.

Figure C2. Effect of Preferences for Gov. Involvement in Countries With and Without Quotas




Table C2. Support for Gender Quotas (Interacting Government Capability index with Quota index)
 This table compares the results from our further analysis to the results presented in the main analysis in the text.

	Model 1 Further Analysis	Model 2 Original Analysis
Sex (Female=1; Male=0)	1.058** (0.364)	1.068** (0.351)
Support for Government Involvement	0.387*** (0.047)	0.369*** (0.044)
Governance Quality (Gov. Capabilities Index)	0.579** (0.183)	0.537** (0.171)
Sex x Support for Gov. Involvement	-0.088 (0.065)	-0.082 (0.063)
Sex x Governance Quality	-0.773** (0.248)	-0.779** (0.237)
Governance Quality x Support for Gov. Involvement	-0.035 (0.031)	-0.022 (0.029)
Sex x Governance Quality x Supp. Gov. Involvement	0.108* (0.044)	0.105* (0.042)
Quota Index	0.175*** (0.034)	0.075*** (0.012)
Governance Quality x Quota Index	-0.045* (0.022)	
<i>Country Level Controls</i>		
GNI per capita	-1.002*** (0.183)	-1.722*** (0.213)
<i>Individual Level Controls</i>		
Left (Ideology 1-3 =1; 8-10=0)	0.129** (0.045)	0.111* (0.045)
Center (Ideology 4-5=1; 8-10=0)	0.000 (0.041)	-0.010 (0.041)
Right (Ideology 6-7=1; 8-10=0)	-0.021 (0.044)	-0.035 (0.045)
Ideology Non-Response (=1; 8-10=0)	-0.018 (0.046)	-0.034 (0.046)
Support for Democracy	0.095*** (0.009)	0.092*** (0.009)
Gender Egalitarian Attitudes	0.018** (0.007)	0.021** (0.007)
Perceptions of Incumbent Gov. Performance	0.036*** (0.010)	0.032** (0.010)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.024* (0.010)	0.019+ (0.010)
Education Level	-0.000 (0.022)	0.028 (0.022)
Rural (=1; Urban=0)	-0.056+ (0.031)	-0.054+ (0.031)
Married or Common Law marriage (=1; Single=0)	-0.005 (0.034)	-0.008 (0.034)
Divorced, Separated, or Widowed (=1; Single=0)	-0.091+ (0.055)	-0.099+ (0.055)
Number of Children	0.004 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)
Age	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Respondents [Countries]	17,083 [24]	17,083 [24]

+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; **p<0.01; *** p<0.001. (Std. Errors). Multilevel ordered logit models with random intercepts.

Figure C3. The effect of Governance Quality by Quota Effectiveness

