American Party Women:
A Look at the Gender Gap within Parties

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Abstract

Research on the gender gap in American politics has focused on average differences between male and female voters. This has led to an underdeveloped understanding of sources of heterogeneity among women and, in particular, a poor understanding of the political preferences of Republican women. We argue that although theories of ideological sorting suggest gender gaps should exist primarily *between* political parties, gender socialization theories contend that critical differences lie at the intersection of gender and party such that gender differences likely persist *within* political parties. Using survey data from the 2012 American National Election Study, we evaluate how party and gender intersect to shape policy attitudes. We find that gender differences in policy attitudes are more pronounced in the Republican Party than in the Democratic Party, with Republican women reporting significantly more moderate views than their male counterparts. Mediation analysis reveals that the gender gaps within the Republican Party are largely attributable to gender differences in beliefs about the appropriate scope of government and attitudes toward gender-based inequality. These results afford new insight into the joint influence of gender and partisanship on policy preferences and raise important questions about the quality of representation Republican women receive from their own party.

Keywords: Gender Gap, Partisanship, Public Opinion, Policy Attitudes, Partisan Sorting

Traditionally, women were more politically conservative than men. Yet, in the early 1980s women began realigning, shifting to the left of men and reversing the gender gap in developed democracies across the globe (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Today, women in the United States are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party, to vote for Democratic Party candidates, and to hold liberal positions on social issues. Although scholars have devoted considerable attention to understanding the gender gap in public opinion, existing research focuses almost exclusively on average differences between men and women—emphasizing women's liberal tendencies and defining women's political identity almost entirely in liberal terms. While women's greater average liberalism is well established empirically, approximately one in four women identify with the Republican Party—a figure that translates into millions of American women who buck this liberal trend (Deckman 2016). Because existing research has focused on average differences between men and women, we know little about sources of heterogeneity among women.

Does the gender gap extend to the Republican Party, with Republican women holding more liberal views than their male counterparts? To date, most research about Republican women has focused on the elite level, investigating factors like party structure, activists and donors, conservative women's groups, and GOP women candidates (Cooperman and Crowder-Meyer 2015; Thomsen 2015). Comparatively little research has considered the attitudes and issue preferences of Republican women in the electorate.[1] In recent years, the U.S. has seen a rise in high-profile Republican women running for office and the development of a conservative women's movement (Schreiber 2008; 2014). The surge in conservative appeals to women, coupled with the increased salience of and polarization on "women's issues"—e.g. the Mommy Wars, the Republican War on Women— requires that scholars revisit the conventional wisdom about women's political identities.

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[1] But see Kaufmann and Petrocik (1999) and Kaufmann (2002), discussed below.

Building on the burgeoning body of research on partisan sorting, we develop expectations regarding the intersection between gender and party. Theories of partisan sorting suggest that women and men sort themselves into the party that best represents their views—such that the gender gap occurs primarily across parties and gender gaps within parties are minimized. This claim seems at odds with theories of gender differences linked to socialization and social roles, which contend that women's shared experiences likely have political consequences that cut across party—raising the possibility of within-party gender gaps. To investigate public opinion at the intersection of gender and party, we first document patterns of public opinion across ten different policy issues using the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES). Our analysis shows that although policy preferences are primarily governed by partisan identification, gender still influences opinion. In particular, Republican women exhibit significantly more moderate policy preferences than Republican men in several issue areas.

Our results suggest that although party sorting accommodates most gender differences in policy preferences, it fails to account for all gender differences in public opinion. Within party gender gaps persist, particularly among Republicans. This raises a second question: What explains gender differences in public opinion among Republicans? We draw on social role and system justification theories of gender differences to develop hypotheses that the Republican gender gap in policy preferences originates from core values and status-oriented beliefs. Using mediation analysis, we show that two of these factors—support for limited government and beliefs about gender inequality in society—largely mediate the relationship between gender and issue support, explaining much of the Republican gender gaps in issue attitudes.

Our findings afford new insights into the joint influence of gender and partisanship on policy preferences and carry important implications for the representation of Republican women. We know from previous research that female legislators are more likely to represent women's policy

preferences than are their male counterparts (Gerrity et al. 2007; Osborn and Mendez 2010; Swers 2013). Given that Republican women remain woefully underrepresented in Congress—and particularly moderate Republican women (Thomsen 2015)—these gaps call into question the extent to which Republican women's preferences are being articulated in the policy-making process.

Gender Gaps in Public Opinion and Partisanship

Over the last twenty years, political scientists and popular media alike have documented pervasive gender gaps across a range of political behaviors, political identities, and partisan preferences. Mounting evidence shows that women are more liberal than men. Not only are women more likely than men to support a host of gender equality policies such as fair-pay, parental leave and childcare subsidies, access to birth control, and protection from job discrimination in hiring and promotion (Barnes and Córdova 2016; Cassese et al. 2015; Deckman and McTague 2015; Strolovitch 1998), but policy preferences diverge also across a wide range of issues that are not explicitly gendered. For instance, women are more liberal on issues of social welfare, morality, and government use of force (Huddy et al. 2008; Kaufmann 2002, 2006; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Women also tend to favor government spending on education, healthcare, and welfare (Schlesinger and Heldman 2001). Women are more likely to oppose war (Huddy et al. 2008) and to favor gun control (Howell and Day 2000). In sum, copious research has documented widespread gender gaps in issue attitudes in which women are more liberal than men.

Gender differences in policy preferences are closely tied to party identification. Women are more likely than men to identify with the Democratic Party (Kanthak and Norrander 2004; Norrander 1999), vote in Democratic primaries (Patterson 2009), and to support Democratic candidates in general elections (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Miller 1991). There is growing evidence that this partisan gender gap is a result of ideological sorting along party lines. As the party system in the U.S. became increasingly polarized at the elite level, members of the public have

responded to elite signals, gravitating to the party that best represents their preferences (Levendusky 2009; Abramowitz 2010). Attitudes toward social welfare issues have become more closely correlated with partisanship for both men and women (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Norrander 1999), and women in particular have responded to the heighted salience of 'culture wars' issues (Kaufman 2002).

Although this pattern can be partially explained by women becoming more liberal and moving into the Democratic Party (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986), party sorting is even more prevalent among men (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004; Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Norrander 1999). Between 1952 to 2004, there was only a 5 percent decline in the share of Republican women, yet there was a 16 percent decline in the share Democratic men (Kaufman 2006). As a result, the gender gap in party identification doubled between the 1970s and the 1990s (Norrander and Wilcox 2008). Moreover, party sorting is most prevalent among citizens who are politically aware and engaged (Zaller, 1992; Carsey and Layman 2006), and consequently, the partisan gender gap is largest among this subset of partisans (Gillion et al. 2015). For example, Abramowitz (2010) finds a 6-point gender gap in partisanship among citizens with low levels of political engagement compared to a 20-point gap among those with high levels of engagement.

Sorting-based accounts of the gender gap have focused primarily on partisanship and the salient issues that connect citizens to the parties. Collectively, they point to a trend toward growing uniformity within the parties on salient political issues. In this fashion, sorting suggests that gender differences matter largely in their relation to parties, and that gender differences in public opinion toward specific policy issues are largely worked out through the sorting process. Although sorting is an important and clearly gendered dynamic, research in this area has focused on average differences between all men and all women, and overlooked differences between men and women of the same party. Yet previous work implies that sorting mechanisms should result in relatively homogeneous

parties—at least with respect to gender. If men and women are sorting themselves into the party that best represents their policy preferences, there should be minimal differences between men and women within the same party. As such, controlling for party should eliminate any residual effect of gender on political attitudes. To capture this expectation, we posit the following hypothesis:

> ***The Party-Sorting Hypothesis***: To the extent that polarization and sorting mechanisms place men and women into the party that most closely approximates their views, gender gaps in policy preferences should exists primarily *between* political parties, with minimal observable differences in issue positions between men and women of the same party.

Moreover, gender differences within and across parties may be related to citizens' levels of political engagement. The sorting literature demonstrates that sorting occurs among politically engaged citizens, who are most tuned in to party polarization and position-taking (Abramowitz 2010; Gillion et al. 2015). These citizens are best able to match the cues they receive from elites to their own political preferences. Because engaged partisans are more likely to have sorted and also more likely to be polarized themselves (e.g. Abramowitz and Saunders 2008), engaged men and women are likely to be more united in their policy positions than less engaged men and women. Specifically, we test the following hypothesis:

> ***The Engaged-Partisans Hypothesis***: Because sorting occurs among the most politically aware and engaged citizens, we will observe fewer gender differences among highly engaged partisans relative to less engaged partisans of the same party.

Evaluating Gender Gaps in Policy Support

To evaluate how party sorting relates to gender differences in public opinion, we use data from the 2012 ANES to identify average gender gaps within parties for ten policy issues: abortion, childcare, education, healthcare, welfare, gay rights, immigration, the millionaire tax, defense spending, and gun control. We selected these issues because they have been identified as important in the party sorting literature, the gender gap literature, or because they were salient in the 2012 election cycle. Measurement information is provided in the Online Appendix. We use Adjusted

Wald tests to compare weighted mean issue positions for male and female Republicans and Democrats across the range of policies. These mean preferences and confidence intervals are graphed in Figure 1.[2] The x-axis lists the policy areas, and the y-axis represents policy preferences, with high scores corresponding to more conservative positions. The policy measures are standardized (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) to facilitate comparisons across issues. The confidence intervals surrounding the means allow us to evaluate whether there is a statistically significant difference between groups at the 95% confidence level.[3]

As one might expect, Figure 1a demonstrates that there are gender gaps across most of the policy areas in our analysis, with women generally holding more liberal attitudes than men. However, party qualifies the observed gender differences in important ways. Figure 1b shows that Republican and Democratic respondents are sharply divided in their policy positions across every issue area examined here. Republicans consistently exhibit more conservative policy preferences than Democrats, indicating that on average respondents are sorted along party lines. The general trends in Figure 1b provide support for the *Party-Sorting Hypothesis.* Nonetheless, important differences exist between men and women of the same party for several of the policy areas.

The Gender Gap among Republicans

First, looking at Republicans, women tend to favor government spending on social welfare programs more so than men. Specifically, women are more supportive of spending on child care (gender gap=0.15)[4] [$F(1,5820)= 6.75$, $p<.01$], education (gender gap=0.25) [$F(1,5849)= 15.75$, $p<.001$], and healthcare (gender gap=0.09) [$F(1,5874)= 3.76$, $p<.05$]. These gaps indicate that even

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[2] Survey weights are applied. All observed gaps, except for the abortion gender gap among Republicans, hold even after controlling for socioeconomic and demographic variables (see Table 1). The direction of the abortion gap is reversed when controls variables are included the in the model. Partisans include leaners. Models were re-estimated excluding leaners as a robustness check and the results did not differ appreciably. These results are provided in Table 5 and 6 of the Online Appendix.

[3] To determine if the means are statistically different at the 95% confidence level, we graph 84% confidence intervals for each of the means. If the 84% confidence intervals do not overlap, we can conclude that the difference between two means is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level (Julious 2004).

[4] In each case, the gap is the difference in weighted mean policy preferences for men and women in each issue area.

though women's issues have become increasingly polarized Republican women hold more moderate views than male copartisans across a range of women's issues. Women (mean=0.32) are also more likely than men (mean=0.51) to favor the millionaire tax [$F(1,5440)= 8.00$, p<=.01]. Nevertheless, women are no more likely than men to favor increased public expenditures for welfare benefits.

With respect to issues linked to violence and use of force, Republican women (mean=0.20) are far more likely than Republican men (mean=0.54) to favor gun control [$F(1,5855)= 41.10$, p<.001]. This is the largest within party gender difference (gender gap=0.34) in our analysis. But, women are no more likely than men to favor defense spending. Finally, Republican women are slightly more likely to support gay rights than are Republican men (gender gap=0.10), although the difference is only marginally significant [$F(1,5839)= 3.54$, p=.06]. There are no differences on abortion or immigration. All together, significant within-party gender differences exist for Republicans on six of the ten issues.

[Figure 1 Here]

The Gender Gap among Democrats

Whereas Republican men and women hold significantly different positions on a number of issues, Democratic men and women have similar views for all but three issue areas. Women (mean= -0.46) are far more likely than men (mean= -0.17) to favor gun control [$F(1,5855)= 35.82$, p<.001]. As with Republicans, the gender gap on gun control is the largest within party gender difference among Democrats. By contrast to women's more liberal views on gun control, men tend to have more liberal views than women on healthcare spending [$F(1,5874)= 7.36$, p<.01] and defense spending [$F(1,5164)= 6.12$, p<.01]. Yet, unlike the gender gaps observed among Republicans, the gender gaps for healthcare spending and defense spending are not statistically significant when we control for other important demographic characteristics (see Table 4 in Online Appendix). Moreover the magnitude of the within party gender gaps for healthcare (gender gap=0.11) and

defense spending (gender gap=0.13) are less than half the size of the gun control gender gap (gender gap=0.29).

Thus, we find asymmetrical support for our *Party-Sorting Hypothesis*. Figure 1b shows that the biggest differences in policy preferences exist between political parties, with Republican women and men exhibiting more conservative policy preferences than Democratic women and men. This fits with accounts of party sorting (e.g. Kaufmann 2006; Gillion et al. 2015). However, significant within-party gender differences are also evident—although primarily within the Republican Party. Thus, it appears that gender continues to offers some explanatory power for policy attitudes, even when taking into account party, indicating that party sorting is not sufficient to explain all gender differences in public opinion.

Gender Gaps among Engaged Partisans

Extant research on party sorting shows that sorting occurs primarily among politically engaged and aware citizens. As a result, the cross-party gender gap may be largest among this subset of highly engaged partisans, as these citizens are better positioned to align themselves with the party that best represents their policy preferences (e.g. Gillion et al. 2015), whereas within-party gender differences are likely to be smallest among this group. To evaluate our *Engaged-Partisans Hypothesis* we distinguish among partisans that are more and less engaged by comparing primary voters to non-voters.[5] We compare within-party gender differences using the same difference-in-means approach described above.

[Figure 2 Here]

Gender Gaps Among Engaged Republicans

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[5] Past work has also relied on political sophistication (Zaller 1992; Carsey and Layman 2006) and education (Gillion et al. 2015) to distinguish among engaged partisans. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of "engaged partisans" (see page 20, Figures 2, 3, and 4 in the Online Appendix).

Consistent with previous literature, Republican primary voters tend to be more conservative than Republican non-voters (see Figure 2a). Moreover, as expected, there are some issues for which the gender gap is larger among non-voters than among voters. Female non-voters exhibit more liberal policy positions than do male non-voters on education spending (gender gap=0.20) [$F(1,3059)$= 6.26, p<.01], gay rights (gender gap=0.16) [$F(1,1973)$= 3.91, p<.05], and gun control (gender gap=0.29) [$F(1,1971)$= 15.01, p<.001].

Nonetheless, less engaged Republicans do not drive gender gaps in issue support across all issue areas. Whereas female non-voters are more liberal than male non-voters for three issue areas, female primary voters are more liberal than male primary voters across four issue areas. In particular, there are large gender gaps among primary voters with respect to child care subsidies (gender gap=0.27) [$F(1,1959)$= 12.09, p<.001], education spending (gender gap=0.36) [$F(1,1966)$= 14.42, p<.001], the millionaire tax (gender gap=.37) [$F(1,1829)$= 12.32, p<.001], and gun control (gender gap=0.41) [$F(1,1971)$= 35.84, p<.001]. For each of these issue areas, not only are male primary voters more conservative then female primary voters, but also, they stand out as being remarkably more conservative than all other Republicans. Abortion is the sole issue area for which female primary voters have a more conservative policy position (mean=0.52) than do male primary voters (mean=0.35), but the difference is only marginally significant (gender gap=0.17) [$F(1,1835)$= 3.42, p=.06]. Meanwhile, there is no gender gap between Republican non-voters.

All told, we observe more gender differences among primary voters than among non-voters, indicating that gender gaps in public opinion are not simply a function of incomplete or imperfect sorting among people with low levels of political engagement. Instead, our results show that even after party sorting takes place, gender remains an important factor for understanding public opinion among Republicans.

Gender Gaps Among Engaged Democrats

Turning next to Figure 2b, we observe far fewer differences between Democratic primary voters and Democratic non-voters. With the exception of healthcare spending and welfare spending, engaged Democrats exhibit comparable preferences to less engaged Democrats. There is less heterogeneity in opinion among Democrats, regardless of their level of engagement. Where gender differences do emerge, women are slightly more moderate than men. With respect to unengaged Democrats, we observe a 0.13 gender gap [$F(1,3068)= 7.37$, p<.01] for healthcare spending, and a gap of 0.12 [$F(1,3069)= 4.52$, p<.06] for immigration policy with favoring higher levels of spending and being more accommodating towards immigrants than women. Among engaged Democrats, women show higher levels of support for defense spending than do men (gender gap=0.19) [$F(1,2652)= 6.56$, p<.01]. Although female Democrats have, on average, more moderate views towards healthcare, immigration, and defense spending than do men, female Democrats have more liberal views on gun control than male Democrats. The gender gap in support for gun control persists among both primary voters (gender gap=0.31) [$F(1,3061)= 14.05$, p<.001] and non-voters (gender gap=0.28) [$F(1,3061)= 21.79$, p<.001] with women exhibiting more support for gun control.

Overall, the trends presented in Figures 2a and 2b do not demonstrate support for our *Engaged-Partisans Hypothesis,* which posits that we will see fewer gender differences among primary voters relative to nonvoters of the same party. Instead, gender differences occur regardless of partisans' levels of engagement. Further, with respect to Republicans, there are more gender gaps among primary voters than non-voters, suggesting that gender differences observed among Republicans in Figure 1b are not driven by a lack of political engagement or awareness. Thus, although partisan sorting is clearly at work and is useful for explaining average gender differences in partisanship, unexplained gender differences in policy preferences exist within parties. Understanding these differences and their origins may be particularly meaningful among Republicans, for whom we see considerable preference heterogeneity based on gender and levels of

engagement. These findings raise an important question: If party sorting does not fully explain gender gaps in policy preferences, what accounts for gender gaps within the parties—particularly the Republican Party?

Below, we develop expectations concerning the effect of core political values on policy support to explain the origins of gender gaps within the Republican Party. The sorting literature is agnostic as to the origins of the gender gap, and therefore cannot explain why gender differences in issue preferences exist to begin with. Other theoretical accounts of political gender difference linked to gender socialization and gender roles argue that common experiences may shape women's underlying values and beliefs about gender-based inequality in a way that cuts across party, explaining why women might maintain significantly more liberal views than their male counterparts of the same party. Yet, it is not clear from previous research how sorting and theories on the origins of the gender gap relate to one another. By bringing the sorting literature into conversation with research on the origins of the gender gap, we move beyond description of gender differences and into a theoretical and empirical investigation of the foundations of gender differences in partisanship and public opinion.

Origins of Gender Gaps in Issue Attitudes

Research on the origins of various political gender gaps has focused on the different social roles, expectations, and stereotypes associated with men and women. Social role theory maintains that gender differences in the aggregate division of labor (both in terms of household labor and occupational segregation) create stereotypic expectations about men's and women's behavior (Eagly et al. 2000). People respond to and internalize these expectations, particularly when they themselves occupy gender-stereotypic roles in their families and the workplace. As a result, stereotypic traits and behaviors are commonly reinforced in men and women, such that men assume more agentic, agency-oriented traits and women assume more communal traits associated with concern for others

(Wood and Eagly 2002). These traits, which stem from common social roles, have implications for public opinion on a variety of political issues (Eagly et al. 2004). For instance, women's communal orientation is commonly linked to their greater endorsement of social welfare programs aimed at disadvantaged groups (Page and Shapiro 1992). Women's roles as mothers and caregivers are associated with their orientation toward liberal policies on healthcare, childcare, education, and homelessness (Schlesinger and Heldman 2001). Because of these close associations between women's traditional roles and gender gaps in these policy areas, such policies are commonly considered "women's issues" (Reingold 2000; Swers 2002).

In addition to specific traits, social roles are associated with broader gender differences in social status. Men's and women's different social, economic, and political statuses translate to differential endorsement of status-oriented ideologies including political conservatism, social dominance orientation, and modern sexism (Jost et al. 2009). There is evidence that these orientations toward status and hierarchy underlie gender differences in policy attitudes (Diekman and Schneider 2010). For instance, men's higher status is associated with a greater tendency to support policies that support or enhance the status quo (Jost and Kay 2005), whereas women support policies that tend to reduce hierarchy, such as social welfare programs (Pratto et al. 1997).

Gender differences in beliefs about gender-based inequality follow a similar pattern. Men and women differ in their beliefs about the persistence and origins of gender inequality in society, ostensibly due to differences in personal experiences with gender discrimination (Manza and Brooks 1998). On average men are more likely to attribute gender-based inequality to individual women and their personal choices, while women are more likely to attribute inequality to systematic discrimination against women (Swim et al. 1995). These beliefs about the origins of gender-based inequality—often referred to as modern sexism—shape policy attitudes. Individuals high in modern sexism are less likely to support policies explicitly designed to mitigate gender inequalities or those

policies that disproportionately benefit women, such as welfare policies. Gender differences in modern sexism cut across the ideological spectrum, with women reporting lower levels of modern sexism than men regardless of their ideological identification (Cassese et al. 2015). Thus, we also posit that men's and women's differential levels of modern sexism work to explain the gender gap we observed among Republicans—particularly their preferences over "women's issues."

Gender differences in socialization, roles, and status are also thought to influence core political values. In particular, gendered patterns are evident in support for a broad scope of government involvement and egalitarian values. As noted above, men's higher social status decreases the likelihood that they believe gender-based inequality and social inequality more generally is caused by and sustained through discrimination. Men are therefore less likely to believe that the government is responsible for decreasing social inequality and thus favor a smaller scope of government. By contrast, women are more likely to attribute inequality to structural factors and believe the government should play a larger, more active role in improving citizens' daily lives (Carroll 2006; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986) and in ensuring equal opportunities for all citizens (Howell and Day 2000; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001). This emphasis on egalitarianism and preferences for a broad scope of government shows through in specific policy positions, e.g. women's greater average support for the welfare state (Barnes and Córdova 2016; Carroll 2006; Deckman and McTague 2015). Consequently, we argue women's underlying values for social equality and their preferences for government involvement help explain the gender gap in public opinion. Given our expectation about how different political values and status-oriented ideologies work together to explain the Republican gender gap in issue attitudes, we posit the following hypothesis:

> _The Mediation Hypothesis:_ Political values (i.e. egalitarianism and scope of government) and status-oriented ideologies (i.e. political conservatism and modern sexism) mediate the relationship between gender and policy attitudes.

Core Values, Status-Oriented Ideologies, and the Republican Party Gender Gap

Research on the origins of the gender gap often uses meditation analysis to consider whether an intervening variable—such as egalitarianism—conveys the effect of gender on policy attitudes or partisanship. Typically, this is accomplished by comparing the effect of gender in a model that does not contain the hypothesized mediating variables to the effect of gender in a model that does contain these variables. When inclusion of one or more mediating variables reduces or eliminates the effect of gender in the model, gender's effect is understood to be partially or completely explained by that variable. For example Ingelhart and Norris (2003) demonstrate that much of the partisan gender gap in advanced industrial democracies is attributable to postmaterialism, support for gender equality, and beliefs about the scope of government. Inclusion of these mediators in the models substantially reduces the size of the gender gap. We adopt a similar approach to examine the extent to which political values explain the Republican gender gap in policy preferences.

Because we observe more gender-based heterogeneity among Republicans relative to Democrats—both in terms of the policy attitudes and our hypothesized mediators—we examine the sources of the Republican gender gap.[6] We compared the estimated effect of respondent gender on issues attitudes in a multivariate model without the hypothesized moderators to one that included the hypothesized moderators (Baron and Kenny 1986). We used a Seemingly Unrelated Regression/Logit (SUR/SUL) method which combines the estimates from multiple models that are jointly estimated to obtain the variance-covariance matrix for coefficients produced by different models, which is necessary to compute accurate standard errors for comparisons of coefficients across models. Then, we used Adjusted Wald Tests to indicate whether the differences in coefficient sizes associated with respondent gender across models that include and exclude our hypothesized moderators are statistically significant.[7]

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[6] Models for Democrats revealed comparatively little evidence of mediation (see Online Appendix – Table 4). For gender and party differences on the mediators see Figure 1 of the Online Appendix.

[7] Adjusted Wald tests offer a conservative test of the change in coefficient size for the logit models.

Ideology was measured with a standard 7-point Likert scale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Scope of government is a six-item standardized scale (e.g. Which of the two statements comes closer to your view: (1) we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems or (2) the free market can handle these problems without government being involved) coded so that high scores correspond to support for limited government (α=.81). Modern sexism is a six-item standardized scale (e.g. When employers make decisions about hiring and promotion, how often do they discriminate against women?) coded so that high scores correspond to high levels of modern sexism (α=.71). Egalitarianism is also a six-item standardized scale (e.g. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country – reversed) coded so that high scores correspond to greater endorsement of egalitarian values (α=.78). Each of these models also includes a full set of demographic controls, along with controls indicating whether respondents were primary voters and their level of political sophistication.[8]

[Table 1 Here]

The results are presented in Table 1. The issue areas are listed at the top of each column. For each policy area, the model on the left excludes mediators and the model on the right includes mediators. Looking first at the models without the mediating variables, the coefficients for respondent gender are negative, indicating that on average female Republicans still have more moderate preferences than male Republicans in fully controlled models. For seven of the ten issue areas—abortion,[9] childcare, education, healthcare, gay rights, the millionaire tax, and gun control— the difference between men and women is statistically significant.

Turning to the models that include mediators, one can see they exert a significant influence on policy attitudes. In each policy model, at least two of the mediators are statistically significant,

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[8] See the Online Appendix for complete measurement information (Table 2). Also see Tables 7-10 in the online appendix where we evaluate differences in policy preferences across age cohorts.
[9] In our initial mean comparison, we observed a gender gap in which Republican women were more conservative than men on abortion. Once we control for religiosity, the gender gap is reversed.

though the pattern varies across issue areas. Their inclusion also results in a reduction in coefficient size for the respondent gender variable. For five of the seven issues, the effect of gender on policy attitudes is no longer statistically significant, indicating complete mediation. The Adjusted Wald Tests demonstrate that the difference in coefficient size between the models is statistically significant in each case at the p<.001 level. This finding is consistent with our *Mediation Hypothesis*.

Attitudes toward welfare, immigration, and defense are an exception to this pattern; male and female Republicans hold comparable views in these policy areas. The initial effect on gender on support for welfare is negative but not statistically significant. Inclusion of the mediators flips the sign, such that Republican women are actually more conservative than Republican men when ideology, scope of government, and modern sexism are accounted for, though this effect is still not statistically significant. This is an interesting result in light of existing scholarship, which argues that men and women's attitudes toward social welfare issues have become increasingly correlated with partisanship over time (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Norrander 1999). It suggests that party sorting largely accommodates gender differences in welfare preferences, though we observe that for most other issue areas there is a residual effect of gender.

Unpacking Multiple Mediation

Looking at the effects of the mediators, some patterns are apparent. Ideology and scope of government influence opinion across all issue areas. Modern sexism and egalitarianism have large effects on policy areas that are typically thought of as women's issues—childcare, education, healthcare, and welfare—though they exert sporadic influence on other policy areas (e.g. millionaire tax) as well. Although these factors have a significant effect on policy attitudes, we do not get a clear picture of the extent to which gender is mediated by each variable using this approach. To better unpack the multiple sources of mediation, we re-estimated the models using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). This approach allows us to directly estimating the direct effect of gender on policy

attitudes, along with the indirect effects channeled through each individual mediator. It also allows us to simultaneously model the covariances between mediators. An example of this modeling strategy is provided in Figure 3, which shows the relationships among respondent gender, the mediating beliefs and values, and support for subsidized childcare. With the mediators included in the model, the direct effect of gender is zero. The indirect effect is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that women's more moderate preferences toward subsidized childcare are a function of these intervening beliefs and values. We further decomposed these indirect effects by mediator (Table 2). For the childcare preferences model, beliefs about the proper scope of government and modern sexism account for 83 percent of the effect of gender on support for subsidized childcare.

[Figure 3 & Table 2 Here]

This approach was used for each of the ten policy areas. Indirect effects of gender for each mediator are provided in the first four columns of Table 2, followed by the direct effect of gender, the combined total indirect effect for all four mediators and the total proportion of the effect of gender that is mediated in each model. Looking across the individual mediators (columns 1-4), it is clear that beliefs about the appropriate scope of government and modern sexism account for most of the Republican gender gap. In eight of ten cases, the indirect effect of gender on policy attitudes conveyed through scope of government is statistically significant. The same is true in eight of ten cases for modern sexism. The two mediators have roughly similar effect sizes across policy areas, such that both are accounting for similar portions of the Republican gender gaps. By contrast, ideology plays a negligible role in explaining the gender gap and egalitarianism does offer any explanatory purchase.

The rightmost column of Table 2 indicates the total proportion of the gender gap in policy attitudes that is explained by the mediators. The mediators explain over one third of the gender gap

for eight of the ten issue areas and over half of the gender gap for six of the ten issue areas. While there is still some residual variance in many cases, a substantial portion of the Republican gender gap is explained by the factors explored here.

Conclusion

The gender gap literature has tended to focus on the gender differences in partisanship, highlighting the factors that account for women's greater affinity with the Democratic Party and men's greater affinity with the Republican Party (e.g. Kaufmann 2002). We find evidence of within-party gender gaps, particularly in the Republican Party. We think the differences between the parties reflect the outcomes of long-term party sorting mechanisms. As a result of the movement of southern white men from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party (Kauffmann and Petrocik 1999), the Democratic Party has lost some of its more moderate constituents and has become more internally cohesive with respect to policy positions.[10] Within the Republican Party, gender still consistently exerts a unique effect on policy positions. Gender gaps in the GOP occur in policy areas that are commonly considered "women's issues"—abortion, subsidized childcare, education, and healthcare—although Republican gender gaps are also evident for other issues, such as gay rights, the millionaire tax, and gun control. These results are consistent with prior claims that "conservative women are gender-conscious political actors" (Schreiber 2008, 475) and also the notion that gender issues "have not been absorbed into the party system" (Sanbonmatsu 2002, 202).

We trace the origins of the gender gaps within the Republican Party to gender differences in beliefs about the appropriate scope of government, attitudes toward gender-based social inequality, and—to a lesser extent—ideological extremity. These results are consistent with literature suggesting that women's roles and experiences cause them to endorse different beliefs and values (e.g. Carroll 2006; Howell and Day 2000). While these factors explain a significant portion of the Republican

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[10] For more on regional differences in the gender gap, see Ondercin (2013).

gender gaps, they do not explain opinion on gun control and gay rights.[11] The Republican gender gap on gun control is among the largest across issue areas and just under 40 percent of the gap is explained by our mediating variables. Past research attributes gender differences on "use of force" issues (including gun control) attribute them to women's different orientation toward aggression and violence and their greater average fear of crime—socialized factors that likely cut across party (for a review see Huddy, Cassese, and Lizotte 2008). Future research should delve deeper into Republican women's attitudes toward gun control, particularly given recent conflict over this issue in Congress and their uniquely moderate position in a seemingly intractable climate for legislating on this issue.

Our findings raise normative questions about the quality of representation experienced by Republican women in this era of heightened partisan polarization. While Republican women in Congress the 1980s and 1990s held more liberal views and roll call records (Swers 2002), beginning in the 109th Congress, Republican women were ideologically indistinguishable from men in the House – even on women's issues (Frederick 2013). Female GOP Senators have retained some discretion to pursue more centrist objectives (Swers 2013), but face significant obstacles to legislating on women's issues, given their small numbers and conservative bases (Swers 2016). Electoral trends point toward increasingly conservative women candidates (Thompsen 2015) and increasingly conservative women attaining leadership positions within the GOP through the Tea Party (Deckman 2016), all of whom are likely to address these issues from a traditional standpoint on gender roles.

Beyond this, even when moderate women are able to gain elective office, their influence on policy is constrained by party culture. The Democratic Party is known as a coalition party with many

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[11] Some evidence suggests these issues have relatively low salience for Republican women. The ANES contains a question asking how important gun control is to you personally; only 32.2% of Republican women said it was very or extremely important. By contrast, 86.09% felt reducing the budget deficit was very or extremely important. Deckman (2012) similarly demonstrates that GOP women place significantly less emphasis on gay rights than economic issues.

diverse internal constituencies, whereas Republicans are governed more by a culture that values singular identification with the party, conformity with the party platform, and eschews special interest claims (Freeman 1986). Because of the Republican Party's more individualistic culture, women's groups lose credibility when they make claims on behalf of women as a group. Making group-based claims "call[s] into question the universal desirability of the Republican program (Freedman, 1986, 338)." Similarly other elites in the GOP – such as activists and donors – who act as "policy demanders" and advocate for policy change, endorse traditional beliefs about gender and women's roles (Cooperman 2016) and express opposition to groups-based claims on behalf of women (Cooperman and Crowder-Meyer 2015; Grossmann and Hopkins 2015). Deckman (2016) acknowledges that conservative women's groups strategically avoid making group-based claims for just this reason. Together, the relatively more moderate views of women in the Republican electorate, combined with the conservative positions of women elected to the GOP and the influence of party culture, calls into question the extent to which the Republican Party is effectively representing Republican women's policy preferences.

These cultural differences at the elite level also help to explain some of what we observe at the mass level. Women in the Democratic Party have played a more active role in shaping policy and the party platform given its greater acceptance of special interest claims (Freeman 1986), and male Democrats at the national level have largely embraced this women's rights policy agenda (Wolbrecht 2000). As a result, male and female Democrats in the electorate have converged in their positions on these issues over time. On the Republican side, the more moderate policy views of women have not been integrated into major legislation or the party platforms. As a result, gender gaps persist among Republicans in the electorate. Because party culture also constrains women in the mass public, we have not seen moderate Republican women emerge as a major force for change within the electorate. Instead these gender gaps reflect a significant, but latent, division within the party.

It is also worth noting that issue positions are not the sole drivers of partisan identity. Partisanship is a symbolic attachment and policy attitudes do not need to perfectly 'match' their group identity (Green et al 2004; Mason 2015). These gender gap issues are thus insufficient to drive women from the Republican Party, especially given the distance observed between the two parties on these issues. Issue salience likely moderates the relationship between these issues and party identification. To the extent that these gap issues are chronically less important or salient to voters than economic issues, they may not exert much cross pressure against women's partisan identity. Deckman's (2012) analysis of issue importance among GOP and Tea Party women demonstrated that the economy, energy, healthcare, and terrorism are the issues that most strongly shape vote choice. If these policy considerations dominate the party platform and campaign rhetoric, we are unlikely to see much effort toward substantive policy change on the gender gap issues at the elite level. Similarly, it is unlikely that we will see shifts in partisanship among moderate Republican women in the electorate—e.g. a mass defection to independent identification. However, a shift in issue salience might activate divisions between men and women, making them more politically consequential in the future.

Finally, the representational implications of this research extend beyond the United States. Historically, left-wing parties hosted the majority of women in parliaments and exhibited a better track-record of representing women (Caul 2001). Yet, as left-wing parties moved to adopt more women-friendly policies, competing parties often responded with policy initiatives that appeal to women in an effort to win back women's votes (Caul 2001). Although right-wing parties have not kept pace with the increases in women's numeric representation on the left, recently there has been a rise in high-profile conservative women pursuing office (O'Brien 2015) and an influx of conservative women gaining access to office as national-level gender quotas (which apply to all parties) have diffused across the globe. Parties from the right have began vying for women's votes, and

increasingly, parties from across the political spectrum make claims on women's behalf (Piscopo 2014). In principle, the increased attention to conservative female constituents is good for representation and democracy more generally. Yet, as more parties and politicians compete for women's support and claim to stand for women, it is increasingly important to understand the policy preferences of conservative women.

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Online Appendix
"American Party Women"

Measurement and Descriptive Statistics

Table 1. Question Wording for Policy Attitude Measures

Policy Area	Survey Items	α
Abortion	1. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor no oppose abortion being legal if: staying pregnant would hurt the woman's health but is very unlikely to cause her to die? [(1) Favor a Great Deal – (9) Oppose a Great Deal] 2. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor no oppose abortion being legal if: staying pregnant could cause the woman to die? [(1) Favor a Great Deal – (9) Oppose a Great Deal] 3. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor no oppose abortion being legal if: the pregnancy was caused by the woman having sex with a blood relative? [(1) Favor a Great Deal – (9) Oppose a Great Deal] 4. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor no oppose abortion being legal if: the pregnancy was caused by the woman being raped? [(1) Favor a Great Deal – (9) Oppose a Great Deal] 5. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor no oppose abortion being legal if: the fetus will be born with a serious birth defect? [(1) Favor a Great Deal – (9) Oppose a Great Deal] 6. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor no oppose abortion being legal if: having the child would be extremely difficult for the woman financially? [(1) Favor a Great Deal – (9) Oppose a Great Deal] 7. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor no oppose abortion being legal if: the child will not be the sex the woman wants it to be? [(1) Favor a Great Deal – (9) Oppose a Great Deal] 8. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor no oppose abortion being legal if the woman chooses to have one? [(1) Favor a Great Deal – (9) Oppose a Great Deal]	.87
Health Care	1. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the health care reform law passed in 2010? This law requires all Americans to buy health insurance and requires health insurance companies to accept everyone. [(1) Favor a Great Deal – (7) Oppose a Great Deal] 2. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? [(1) Government Health Insurance Plan – (7) Private Health Insurance Plan] 3. Thinking about public expenditure on health, should there be: [much more than now, somewhat more than now, the same as now, somewhat less than now, or much less than now]? 4. [After/If] the health care law is fully implemented, will it have improved, worsened, or had no effect on the quality of health care services in the United States? [Improved, No Effect, Worsened] 5. [After/If] the health care law is fully implemented, will it have increased, decreased, or had no effect on the number of Americans with health insurance? [Improved, No Effect, Worsened]	.76
Welfare	Thinking about public expenditure on welfare benefits, should there be -- ([much more than now, somewhat more than now, the same as now, somewhat less than now, or much less than now / much less than now, somewhat less than now, the same as now, somewhat more than now, or much more than now])?	
Gun Control	Do you think the federal government should make it more difficult for people to buy a gun than it is now, make it easier for people to buy a gun, or keep the rules about the same as they are now? [More Difficult, The Same, Easier]	
Gay Rights	1. Should gay and lesbian couples be allowed to adopt? [Yes, No] 2. Which comes closest to your view? [gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally marry., gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to form civil unions but not legally marry, there should be no legal recognition of a gay or lesbian couple's relationship]	.78
Defense	Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? [(1) Greatly Decrease Defense Spending – (7) Greatly Increase Defense Spending]	
Immigration	1. Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be toward unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States? [allow unauthorized immigrants	.72

	to remain in the united states ...without penalties, allow unauthorized immigrants to remain in the united states ...certain requirements have a guest worker program that allows unauthorized immigrants to remain, make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home country] 2. There is a proposal to allow people who were illegally brought into the U.S. as children to become permanent U.S. residents under some circumstances. Specifically, citizens of other countries who illegally entered the U.S. before age 16, who have lived in the U.S. 5 years or longer, and who graduated high school would be allowed to stay in the U.S. as permanent residents if they attend college or serve in the military. From what you have heard, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose this proposal? [Favor, Neither Favor Nor Oppose, Oppose] 3. Some states have passed a law that will require state and local police to determine the immigration status of a person if they find that there is a reasonable suspicion he or she is an undocumented immigrant. Those found to be in the U.S. without permission will have broken state law. From what you have heard, do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose these immigration laws? [Favor, Neither Favor Nor Oppose, Oppose] 4. Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be [increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, decreased a lot]? 5. Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be [increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, decreased a lot]?	
Millionaire Tax	Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose increasing income taxes on people making over one million dollars per year? [Favor, Neither Favor nor Oppose, Oppose]	
Child Care	What about child care? Should spending on child care be increased, decreased, or kept about the same? [Increased, Kept the Same, Decreased]	
Education	What about the public schools? Should spending on the public schools be increased, decreased, or kept about the same? [Increased, Kept the Same, Decreased]	

Where applicable, policy items were combined to form standardized variables. Standardization was performed using the weighted sample means and standard deviations for each item and set of items. Variables are coded so that high scores correspond to more conservative responses.

Table 2. Measurement of Mediating Variables and Control Variables

Variable	Survey Items	α
Mediating Variables		
Ideology	A 7-point Likert scale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.	--
Scope of Government	A composite scale consisting of the following six items, coded so that high scores correspond to preferences for limited government: 1. Which of the two statements comes closer to your view: (1) the main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves; OR (2) government has become bigger because the problems we face have become bigger. 2. Which of the two statements comes closer to your view: (1) the less government, the better; OR (2) there are more things that government should be doing? 3. Which of the two statements comes closer to your view: (1) we need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems; OR (2) the free market can handle these problems without government being involved. 4. How much government regulation of business is good for society? [(1)A great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, or (4) none at all]? 5. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? [(1) Government should provide many fewer services (reduce spending a lot) – (7) Government should provide many more services (increase spending a lot).] 6. Do you think the federal government's powers pose a threat to the rights and freedoms of ordinary citizens, or not? [poses a threat, does not pose a threat] Combined with the follow-up branching question: How threatening to rights and freedoms are the federal government's powers? [extremely threatening, very threatening, moderately threatening, or slightly threatening]?	.81
Modern Sexism	A composite scale consisting of the following six items, coded so that high scores correspond to high levels of modern sexism: 1. How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups? Women [A great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, or none at all]? 2. How serious a problem is discrimination against women in the United States? [Not a problem at all, a minor problem, a moderately serious problem, a very serious problem, or an extremely serious problem]? 3. When employers make decisions about hiring and promotion, how often do they discriminate against women? [Never, some of the time, about half the time, most of the time, or always]? 4. Should the news media pay more attention to discrimination against women, less attention, or the same amount of attention	.71

	they have been paying lately? [A great deal more, somewhat more, a little more, the same amount of attention, a little less, somewhat less, a great deal less] 5. When women complain about discrimination, how often do they cause more problems than they solve? [Never, some of the time, about half the time, most of the time, or always? 6. In the U.S. today, do men have more opportunities for achievement than women have, do women have more opportunities than men, or do they have equal opportunities? [Men have many more, men have moderately more, men have slightly more, equal opportunities, women have slightly more, women have moderately more, women have many more]	
Egalitarianism	A composite scale consisting of the following six items, coded so that high scores correspond to greater endorsement of egalitarian values: 1. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed. Do you [agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly] with this statement? 2. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. Do you [agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly] with this statement? 3. One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance. Do you [agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly] with this statement? 4. This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are. Do you [agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly] with this statement? 5. It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others. Do you [agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly] with this statement? 6. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems. Do you [agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, disagree strongly] with this statement?	.78
Control Variables		
Religiosity	A composite scale consisting of the amount of guidance religion provides respondents in their daily lives, frequency of prayer, frequency of church attendance, and beliefs about the bible.	.82
Married	A dummy variable coded 1 if respondents are married and zero otherwise.	--
Education	Education attainment measured in five categories: Less than a high school degree, high school degree, some college, bachelor's degree, and graduate degree.	--
Income	Household income measured in 18 increments, ranging from "under	--

	$5,000, to "greater than \$250,000"	
Employed Homemaker	A series of dummy variables indicating employment status, with unemployed and retired serving as the baseline categories.	--
Age	Respondent age in years.	--
Kids < 18	The number of children under the age of 18 living in the respondents home.	--
Black Hispanic Other Race	A series of dummy variables indicating respondent race. White is the excluded category.	--
Primary Voter	Dummy variable coded 1 if respondents voted in the primary and 0 otherwise.	--
Political Knowledge	Additive score of correct responses to the four office recognition items.	.70

Where indicated, items were combined to form standardized variables. Standardization was performed using the weighted sample means and standard deviations for each item and set of items.

Figure 1: Mediators by Party and Gender

Note: Egalitarianism is reversed here, such that high scores correspond to anti-egalitarian positions. In the models presented in the paper, high scores on egalitarianism correspond to greater endorsement of egalitarian views.

Mediation Analyses

In this section, we present the fully specified mediation models for Republicans (Table 3) and Democrats (Table 4). In the text of the manuscript we present curtailed models for Republicans (excluding control variables). The Republican models presented here, are the same as those in the text but also include the coefficients for all of the control variables in the analyses.

Table 3. Fully Specified Mediation Models for Republicans

	Abortion		Child Care		Education		Health Care		Welfare		Gay Rights		Immigration		Mill. Tax		Defense		Gun Control	
Female	-0.18**	-0.11	-0.38**	-0.09	-0.52***	-0.25	-0.12*	0.03	-0.12	0.20	-0.32***	-0.23***	-0.00	0.07	-0.25***	-0.02	-0.08	-0.07	-0.74***	-0.44**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Diff.	F=11.71***		F=17.62***		F=15.08***		F=24.72***		--		F=15.83***		--		F=35.12***		--		F=18.46***	
Ideology		0.17***		0.11		0.16*		0.11***		0.20**		0.16***		0.07**		0.14***		0.07*		0.19*
		(0.03)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.02)		(0.07)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.08)
Scope of Gov.		0.10*		0.65***		0.70***		0.39***		0.74***		0.07		0.14***		0.42***		0.04		0.86***
		(0.04)		(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.03)		(0.10)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.11)
Mod. Sexism		0.05		0.34***		0.45***		0.06*		0.28***		0.08*		0.06		0.22***		-0.04		0.36***
		(0.04)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.03)		(0.08)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.08)
Egalitarianism		-0.02		-0.32***		-0.30***		-0.08**		-0.45***		-0.05		-0.06		-0.09*		-0.04		-0.16
		(0.03)		(0.07)		(0.08)		(0.03)		(0.08)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.09)
Religiosity	0.57***	0.52***	0.06	0.02	0.03	-0.04	0.06*	0.02	0.01	-0.08	0.42***	0.38***	-0.05	-0.08**	0.05	-0.00	0.10***	0.08**	-0.00	-0.08
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Married	0.07	0.06	0.17	0.08	-0.04	-0.13	0.07	0.04	0.30	0.22	0.06	0.05	-0.10	-0.13*	-0.01	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04	0.09	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Education	-0.04	-0.05	0.00	-0.03	0.10	0.10	-0.03	-0.04*	0.01	-0.03	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.19***	-0.19***	0.02	0.01	-0.14***	-0.15***	-0.05	-0.08
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Income	-0.01*	-0.01*	0.03***	0.03**	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02*	0.02*	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01*	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employed	-0.09	-0.10	0.36*	0.28	0.05	-0.13	0.16**	0.12*	0.50***	0.41**	0.01	0.00	0.22***	0.20**	0.11	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.23	0.12
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Homemaker	0.06	-0.02	1.03***	0.80**	0.50	0.16	0.16	0.01	0.37	0.02	0.08	-0.02	0.04	-0.04	0.43**	0.21	0.11	0.09	0.12	-0.25
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.25)	(0.28)
Age	-0.01**	-0.01**	0.01	0.01	0.02***	0.02***	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01*	0.00*	0.00*	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Kids<18	0.09	0.13	-0.58***	-0.51**	-0.55***	-0.42*	0.01	0.10	-0.10	0.07	-0.04	0.00	0.06	0.10	-0.14	-0.05	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.15
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Black	0.10	0.20	-0.34	0.06	-1.47**	-1.13*	-0.42**	-0.21	-0.55	-0.17	-0.09	0.01	-0.35*	-0.25	0.08	0.36	-0.23	-0.19	-0.66	-0.19
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.53)	(0.50)	(0.52)	(0.57)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.27)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Hispanic	0.09	0.17	-0.33	-0.11	-0.02	0.30	-0.34**	-0.18*	-0.34	-0.11	-0.05	0.04	-0.55***	-0.48***	0.13	0.31**	0.08	0.13	-0.50	-0.23
	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.35)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Other Race	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.14	0.05	0.06	-0.13	-0.11	-0.36	-0.40	0.13	0.14	-0.07	-0.07	-0.12	-0.09	0.10	0.10	-0.28	-0.26
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.30)	(0.31)
Primary Voter	0.12*	0.05	0.34**	0.12	0.41**	0.15	0.22***	0.09*	0.29*	0.03	0.10	0.03	0.15**	0.08	0.35***	0.18**	0.19***	0.15**	0.10	-0.20
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Political Know.	-0.01	-0.06*	0.36***	0.19***	0.33***	0.15*	0.11***	0.00	0.29***	0.06	0.01	-0.05*	0.04	-0.02	0.15***	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.21**	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)
South	-0.03	-0.02	-0.15	-0.14	-0.60***	-0.67***	0.04	0.04	0.18	0.26*	0.06	0.07	0.13*	0.14*	0.06	0.07	0.13*	0.12*	0.13	0.17
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Constant	0.76***	-0.09					0.18	-0.41**			0.36*	-0.44*	0.68***	0.30	0.15	-0.61*	0.36*	-0.00		
	(0.15)	(0.20)					(0.14)	(0.15)			(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.23)		
Cut 1			0.02	0.59	1.33***	2.44***			-3.24***	-2.65***									-1.27**	-0.36
			(0.31)	(0.43)	(0.36)	(0.51)			(0.50)	(0.60)									(0.39)	(0.57)
Cut 2			2.31***	3.20***	3.14***	4.53***			-1.61***	-0.87									2.42***	3.84***
			(0.32)	(0.44)	(0.37)	(0.52)			(0.38)	(0.51)									(0.40)	(0.59)
Cut 3									0.47	1.47**										
									(0.35)	(0.48)										
Cut 4									2.21***	3.54***										
									(0.36)	(0.49)										
Observations	5687	5677	5676	5666	5682	5672	5689	5679	5682	5672	5687	5677	5689	5679	5681	5672	5578	5573	5685	5675
Adjusted R²	0.32	0.37	0.10	0.27	0.10	0.30	0.12	0.37	0.09	0.16	0.22	0.28	0.10	0.14	0.08	0.26	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.20

Entries are coefficients from Seemingly Unrelated Regression and Seemingly Unrelated Logit Models with standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights are applied. Differences in the coefficient sizes for respondent gender are evaluated using Adjusted Wald Tests. Models are restricted to Republican respondents, including learners. Adjusted R² for ordered logits are calculated using Wherry's formula. ^ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table 4. Fully Specified Mediation Models for Democrats

	Abortion		Childcare		Education		Healthcare		Welfare		Gay Rights		Immigration		Mill. Tax		Defense		Gun Control	
Female	-0.14***	-0.11**	0.06	0.16	-0.16	-0.08	0.04	0.09*	0.00	0.08	-0.17***	-0.13**	-0.01	0.04	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.07	-0.81***	-0.80***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Diff	F= 5.57*		--		--		--		--		F=11.46***		--		--		--		F=0.04	
Ideology		0.11***		0.09*		0.10^		0.12***		0.20***		0.10***		0.09***		0.05*		0.11***		0.05
		(0.02)		(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.02)		(0.05)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.05)
Scope of Gov.		0.05		0.58***		0.30**		0.27***		0.49***		0.05		0.17***		0.03		-0.06		0.53***
		(0.03)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.03)		(0.09)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.09)
Mod. Sexism		0.06*		0.24***		0.13		0.03		0.16*		0.08**		0.06*		0.06*		0.02		0.02
		(0.02)		(0.07)		(0.09)		(0.02)		(0.06)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.07)
Egalitarianism		-0.06*		-0.11		-0.39***		-0.19***		-0.17*		-0.05^		-0.12***		-0.06*		-0.15***		-0.24**
		(0.03)		(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.03)		(0.08)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.08)
Religiosity	0.34***	0.32***	-0.00	-0.01	-0.08	-0.09	0.05*	0.03^	-0.01	-0.05	0.28***	0.26***	0.11***	0.10***	0.02	0.02	0.10***	0.08**	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Married	0.08^	0.05	-0.22^	-0.32*	-0.21	-0.32^	0.06	-0.02	-0.05	-0.14	0.10*	0.07	-0.04	-0.10^	0.03	-0.00	-0.07	-0.11^	0.28*	0.20
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Education	-0.12***	-0.08***	-0.13*	-0.07	-0.10	-0.03	-0.12***	-0.08***	-0.11*	-0.03	-0.10***	-0.07***	-0.19***	-0.15***	-0.03^	-0.01	-0.11***	-0.08**	-0.10^	-0.06
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Income	-0.01*	-0.01**	0.03***	0.03***	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	0.04***	0.04***	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01*	-0.01*	0.01^	0.01^	-0.03**	-0.03**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employed	-0.02	-0.03	-0.16	-0.16	-0.25	-0.28^	0.03	0.01	0.25*	0.24*	-0.07	-0.09^	0.08	0.07	-0.16***	-0.16***	0.04	0.03	-0.03	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Homemaker	0.18^	0.14	-0.09	-0.15	-0.04	-0.07	-0.00	-0.01	0.02	-0.04	0.13	0.07	-0.03	-0.00	-0.29***	-0.31***	-0.09	-0.07	-0.48^	-0.56^
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.28)	(0.29)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.02**	0.02**	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.01***	0.01***	0.00	0.00	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.00	0.00	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Kids<18	0.03	0.04	-0.46***	-0.44**	0.10	0.15	0.03	0.05	-0.22^	-0.16	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.05	-0.01	0.00	0.06	0.06	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Black	-0.03	0.03	-0.72***	-0.39*	-0.30	0.02	-0.17**	0.02	-0.51***	-0.19	0.26***	0.33***	-0.26***	-0.12^	0.12*	0.16**	0.06	0.11	-0.46*	-0.16
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Hispanic	0.04	0.05	-0.10	0.02	0.00	0.08	-0.08	-0.04	-0.27^	-0.17	0.21**	0.23***	-0.80***	-0.76***	0.14*	0.15*	-0.12	-0.11	-0.63***	-0.54**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.19)
Other Race	0.13	0.14	0.18	0.21	0.14	0.12	0.12	0.13*	-0.06	-0.01	0.30**	0.31**	0.09	0.11	0.17^	0.18^	-0.09	-0.07	-0.28	-0.35
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Primary Voter	0.00	0.03	-0.09	-0.07	0.04	0.09	-0.08^	-0.04	-0.28*	-0.24*	0.02	0.04	-0.04	-0.02	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.10^	0.19	0.25^
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Political Know.	-0.11***	-0.07***	0.02	0.11*	-0.01	0.08	-0.13***	-0.06***	-0.08^	0.03	-0.08***	-0.04*	-0.16***	-0.10***	-0.08***	-0.05**	-0.17***	-0.13***	-0.26***	-0.21**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)
South	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	-0.05	-0.29^	-0.33*	-0.03	-0.06	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.10^	0.11^	0.10	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.14)
				(0.03)		(0.08)				(0.03)				(0.03)				(0.03)		(0.04)
Constant	0.45***	0.00					-0.03	-0.48***			-0.18	-0.59***	0.58***	0.21	0.39**	0.19	0.01	-0.45**		
	(0.12)	(0.13)					(0.11)	(0.12)			(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.17)		
Cut 1			-0.68*	-0.38	1.31***	1.76***			-3.09***	-2.34***									-2.04***	-2.03***
			(0.29)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.48)			(0.33)	(0.38)									(0.34)	(0.44)
Cut 2			1.82***	2.27***	3.55***	4.06***			-1.62***	-0.83*									1.02**	1.12*
			(0.30)	(0.38)	(0.43)	(0.52)			(0.30)	(0.36)									(0.39)	(0.47)
Cut 3									0.61*	1.55***										
									(0.29)	(0.36)										
Cut 4									2.27***	3.32***										
									(0.30)	(0.38)										
Observations	5530	5473	5525	5467	5537	5478	5544	5483	5517	5461	5539	5479	5545	5484	5533	5473	5188	5147	5537	5477
Adjusted R^2	0.29	0.33	0.05	0.27	0.02	0.28	0.12	0.34	0.05	0.21	0.26	0.30	0.20	0.28	0.13	0.16	0.11	0.15	0.04	0.20

Entries are coefficients from Seemingly Unrelated Regression and Seemingly Unrelated Logit Models with standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights are applied. Differences in the coefficient sizes for respondent gender are evaluated using Adjusted Wald Tests. Models are restricted to Democratic respondents, including learners. Adjusted R^2 for ordered logits are calculated using Wherry's formula. ^ $p<0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Mediation Analyses Excluding Political Leaners

The main analyses in our manuscript codes Republicans as those individuals who identify as a "Strong Republican," "Republican," and "Lean Republican." Similarly, Democrats are those individuals who identify as "Strong Democrat," "Democrat," and "Lean Democrat." We re-estimated the mediation models from the manuscript excluding the leaners. A comparison of the models that include and exclude leaners reveals only modest differences. Even when excluding political leaners, we still observe significant gender gaps among Republicans in the same 7 of 10 issue areas and evidence of mediation is still found in each of these cases. Similarly we observe gender gaps among the Democrats in the same 3 of 10 issues and mediation in the same two of these areas. These results are presented in Tables 5 and 6.

Table 5. Mediation Models for Republicans excluding Political Leaners

	Abortion		Childcare		Education		Healthcare		Welfare		Gay Rights		Immigration		Millionaire Tax		Defense		Gun Control	
Female	-0.16*	-0.09	-0.38*	-0.11	-0.59***	-0.39*	-0.12*	-0.02	-0.01	0.28	-0.30***	-0.25***	0.03	0.08	-0.17^	0.01	-0.07	-0.06	-0.78***	-0.51**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.18)	(0.19)
	F= 5.80*		F= 10.37**		F= 5.74*		F= 8.60**		--		F= 3.33^		--		F= 16.94***		--		F= 9.43**	
Ideology		0.15***		0.09		0.13		0.13***		0.21*		0.18***		0.07*		0.13**		0.08*		0.13
		(0.03)		(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.02)		(0.09)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.09)
Scope of Gov.		0.10*		0.57***		0.57***		0.36***		0.75***		0.04		0.15**		0.39***		0.05		0.95***
		(0.05)		(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.03)		(0.12)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.13)
Mod. Sexism		0.06		0.42***		0.45***		0.04		0.31***		0.04		0.03		0.21***		-0.02		0.35***
		(0.04)		(0.08)		(0.10)		(0.03)		(0.09)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.09)
Egalitarianism		-0.01		-0.32***		-0.33**		-0.09**		-0.45***		-0.07		-0.07		-0.08		-0.03		-0.13
		(0.04)		(0.09)		(0.10)		(0.03)		(0.09)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.11)
Religiosity	0.58***	0.54***	0.04	-0.03	0.10	0.04	0.06*	0.01	-0.07	-0.19*	0.42***	0.38***	-0.04	-0.07*	0.08	0.02	0.09**	0.07	0.10	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Married	0.00	-0.01	0.17	0.09	-0.08	-0.16	0.12	0.10*	0.26	0.22	0.08	0.08	-0.17*	-0.19*	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.08	0.03
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Education	-0.05	-0.05	-0.03	-0.04	0.17*	0.19*	-0.04	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.08	-0.09*	-0.10**	-0.20***	-0.20***	0.02	0.02	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.04	-0.07
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Income	-0.01*	-0.01**	0.03**	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02*	0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employed	-0.05	-0.07	0.38*	0.33	-0.03	-0.21	0.14*	0.08	0.53**	0.44*	0.01	-0.00	0.23**	0.19*	0.12	0.05	0.08	0.07	0.06	-0.08
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Homemaker	0.08	0.02	0.91**	0.73*	0.22	-0.07	0.08	-0.04	0.13	-0.15	0.06	-0.01	-0.05	-0.10	0.25	0.10	0.10	0.07	-0.12	-0.48
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Age	-0.01**	-0.01**	0.01	0.01	0.02**	0.02**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Kids<18	0.12	0.18*	-0.61**	-0.49*	-0.64**	-0.49*	-0.04	0.09	0.09	0.37	-0.10	-0.03	0.06	0.12	-0.30**	-0.16	0.01	0.05	-0.26	0.00
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Black	-0.05	0.09	0.10	0.68	-1.81**	-1.27	-0.45*	-0.21	-0.80	-0.26	-0.04	0.09	-0.35	-0.22	0.27	0.60*	-0.59*	-0.53	-0.71	-0.17
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.56)	(0.52)	(0.64)	(0.69)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.73)	(0.61)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.39)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.46)	(0.51)
Hispanic	0.08	0.18	-0.31	0.02	0.01	0.43	-0.41**	-0.20*	-0.51	-0.15	-0.14	-0.04	-0.65***	-0.56***	0.04	0.28*	0.15	0.22	-0.80*	-0.48
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.30)	(0.37)	(0.33)	(0.40)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.32)	(0.34)
Other Race	0.05	0.07	0.29	0.36	-0.09	-0.13	-0.02	0.01	-0.41	-0.44	0.01	0.02	-0.12	-0.10	-0.16	-0.12	0.13	0.14	-0.63	-0.72
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.39)	(0.42)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.41)	(0.41)
Primary Voter	0.10	0.04	0.26	0.10	0.41**	0.21	0.16**	0.04	0.17	-0.07	0.07	0.02	0.15*	0.09	0.33***	0.19*	0.21**	0.19**	0.02	-0.28
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Political Know.	0.03	-0.03	0.39***	0.24***	0.29***	0.12	0.12***	0.02	0.32***	0.10	0.02	-0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.14**	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.22**	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.08)
South	0.05	0.04	-0.04	-0.07	-0.57***	-0.69***	0.08	0.05	0.19	0.20	0.11	0.10	0.17**	0.16*	0.09	0.07	0.11	0.09	0.16	0.14
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Constant	0.82***	0.03					0.24	-0.49**			0.52**	-0.36	0.74***	0.32	0.16	-0.65*	0.40	-0.00		
	(0.19)	(0.25)					(0.15)	(0.17)			(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.29)		
Cut 1			-0.14	0.52	1.38**	2.40***			-3.35***	-2.46**									-1.84***	-1.17
			(0.39)	(0.53)	(0.45)	(0.64)			(0.60)	(0.76)									(0.47)	(0.72)
Cut 2			2.21***	3.19***	3.26***	4.57***			-1.67***	-0.68									2.01***	3.22***
			(0.40)	(0.54)	(0.46)	(0.65)			(0.46)	(0.68)									(0.50)	(0.74)
Cut 3									0.33	1.57*										
									(0.42)	(0.63)										
Cut 4									2.07***	3.68***										
									(0.43)	(0.64)										
Observations	5770	5766	5759	5755	5767	5763	5771	5767	5765	5761	5771	5767	5771	5767	5764	5761	5696	5695	5768	5764
Adjusted R^2	0.33	0.38	0.07	0.24	0.10	0.29	0.12	0.39	0.09	0.15	0.20	0.25	0.12	0.16	0.07	0.24	0.09	0.10	0.05	0.20

Entries are coefficients from Seemingly Unrelated Regression and Seemingly Unrelated Logit Models with standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights are applied. Differences in the coefficient sizes for respondent gender are evaluated using Adjusted Wald Tests. Models are restricted to Republican respondents, excluding learners. Adjusted R^2 for ordered logits are calculated using Wherry's formula. ^ $p<0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 6. Mediation Models for Democrats excluding Political Leaners

	Abortion		Childcare		Education		Healthcare		Welfare		Gay Rights		Immigration		Millionaire Tax		Defense		Gun Control	
Female	-0.16**	-0.13*	0.07	0.20	-0.13	-0.02	0.04	0.09*	-0.06	0.03	-0.18***	-0.14**	-0.04	0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.03	0.06	-0.90***	-0.89***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Diff	F= 4.45*		--		--		--		--		F= 8.47**		--		--		--		F= 0.03	
Ideology		0.10***		0.13**		0.10		0.12***		0.17**		0.10***		0.09***		0.06**		0.13***		0.01
		(0.02)		(0.05)		(0.07)		(0.02)		(0.06)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.05)
Scope of Gov.		0.08*		0.58***		0.35**		0.27***		0.50***		0.07^		0.22***		0.02		-0.04		0.44***
		(0.04)		(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.03)		(0.10)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.11)
Mod. Sexism		0.06*		0.21**		0.15		0.03		0.17*		0.08**		0.04		0.08**		0.03		0.04
		(0.03)		(0.07)		(0.10)		(0.02)		(0.07)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.08)
Egalitarianism		-0.07*		-0.18*		-0.42***		-0.20***		-0.19^		-0.02		-0.14***		-0.06*		-0.12**		-0.34***
		(0.03)		(0.09)		(0.11)		(0.03)		(0.10)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.10)
Religiosity	0.36***	0.34***	-0.01	-0.03	-0.12	-0.14	0.06*	0.04^	0.01	-0.02	0.29***	0.27***	0.11***	0.10***	0.03	0.02	0.13***	0.10**	0.07	0.09
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Married	0.10^	0.07	-0.22	-0.33*	-0.21	-0.32	0.11*	0.04	-0.18	-0.26^	0.12*	0.09	-0.07	-0.12*	0.05	0.03	-0.07	-0.11	0.21	0.13
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Education	-0.12***	-0.08***	-0.18**	-0.10	-0.14^	-0.06	-0.13***	-0.08***	-0.10	0.01	-0.11***	-0.08**	-0.18***	-0.13***	-0.01	0.01	-0.09**	-0.06*	-0.09	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Income	-0.01^	-0.01*	0.03**	0.03**	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	0.04***	0.04***	0.00	-0.00	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01**	-0.01**	0.01*	0.01^	-0.03**	-0.03**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employed	-0.04	-0.05	-0.23^	-0.24^	-0.20	-0.23	0.02	0.00	0.27*	0.25^	-0.07	-0.08	0.09	0.08	-0.13**	-0.13*	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Homemaker	0.19^	0.14	-0.22	-0.28	0.00	-0.07	-0.05	-0.06	0.11	0.06	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.04	-0.21*	-0.23*	-0.00	0.01	-0.46	-0.49
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.31)	(0.33)
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.01^	0.01*	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.01**	0.01**	0.00	0.00	-0.01***	-0.01***	0.00	0.00	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Kids<18	0.03	0.05	-0.53***	-0.52**	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.04	-0.23	-0.17	0.03	0.06	0.05	0.05	-0.03	-0.01	0.04	0.03	-0.09	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Black	-0.07	-0.01	-0.81***	-0.55**	-0.46^	-0.17	-0.13*	0.02	-0.53**	-0.24	0.23**	0.29***	-0.24***	-0.11	0.12^	0.15*	0.08	0.11	-0.47*	-0.20
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Hispanic	-0.03	-0.01	-0.17	-0.12	-0.02	0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.34*	-0.25	0.17*	0.18*	-0.77***	-0.76***	0.13*	0.14*	-0.15^	-0.15^	-0.56**	-0.52**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Other Race	0.12	0.14	0.05	0.12	0.02	-0.02	0.15	0.15*	-0.23	-0.18	0.34**	0.37**	0.14	0.16^	0.07	0.07	-0.16	-0.14	-0.18	-0.25
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Primary Voter	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.28^	0.33^	-0.09^	-0.06	-0.29*	-0.26*	-0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.19	0.24
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Political Know.	-0.10***	-0.05*	0.02	0.11^	-0.01	0.08	-0.11***	-0.04*	-0.11^	0.00	-0.09***	-0.05*	-0.14***	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.05*	-0.16***	-0.11***	-0.26***	-0.22**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.08)
South	-0.02	-0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.37*	-0.40*	-0.07	-0.09*	0.05	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.01	-0.01	0.07	0.06	0.14*	0.15*	0.12	0.12
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Constant	0.48***	0.00					-0.00	-0.47**			-0.11	-0.56***	0.59***	0.21	0.36*	0.06	-0.05	-0.63**		
	(0.14)	(0.15)					(0.13)	(0.14)			(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.20)		
Cut 1			-1.05**	-0.60	0.95*	1.45*			-3.10***	-2.34***									-1.98***	-2.10***
			(0.34)	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.60)			(0.38)	(0.45)									(0.41)	(0.51)
Cut 2			1.44***	2.07***	3.28***	3.85***			-1.65***	-0.85*									1.05*	1.03^
			(0.35)	(0.45)	(0.52)	(0.65)			(0.34)	(0.43)									(0.49)	(0.58)
Cut 3									0.54	1.46***										
									(0.33)	(0.42)										
Cut 4									2.17***	3.20***										
									(0.34)	(0.43)										
Observations	5633	5587	5630	5584	5638	5591	5641	5593	5624	5579	5639	5591	5642	5594	5635	5587	5353	5320	5637	5589
Adjusted R^2	0.29	0.34	0.04	0.26	0.01	0.27	0.12	0.35	0.05	0.21	0.27	0.31	0.19	0.29	0.12	0.16	0.11	0.16	0.04	0.19

Entries are coefficients from Seemingly Unrelated Regression and Seemingly Unrelated Logit Models with standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights are applied. Differences in the coefficient sizes for respondent gender are evaluated using Adjusted Wald Tests. Models are restricted to Democrats respondents, excluding learners. Adjusted R^2 for ordered logits are calculated using Wherry's formula. ^ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Age Cohort Analyses

In this section of the Appendix, we estimate a series of models to assess if younger cohorts of Republicans and Democrats are more conservative than older cohorts of partisans who grew up during the second wave of feminism. In particular, we assess if they have more conservative issue attitudes or political values. To do this, we first created generational cohort dummies for the Silent Generation, Generation X, and Millennial Generation. In each of the analyses presented in this section, Baby Boomers—those growing up during the second wave of feminism—comprised the reference category. Second, to assess the difference between women and men, and to facilitate interpretation of the results, we analyzed separate models for Republican women, Republican men, Democrat women, and Democrat men (i.e., the statistical equivalent to the fully interactive model). Although we find very few generational differences exist among women, we do find some evidence of variability among men.

Table 7. Predictors of Issue Attitudes for Republicans Women with Age Cohorts

	Abortion	Childcare	Education	Healthcare	Welfare	Gay Rights	Immigration	Millionaire Tax	Defense	Gun Control
Religiosity	0.61***	0.13	0.01	0.11**	0.02	0.50***	-0.01	0.14**	0.12**	0.14
	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.11)
Married	-0.04	0.16	0.25	0.07	0.31	-0.10	-0.20^	-0.12	0.08	0.11
	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.08)	(0.26)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.27)
Education	-0.07	0.01	0.20*	-0.01	0.12	-0.13**	-0.23***	0.04	-0.09*	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Income	-0.01^	0.03*	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	-0.00	0.01^	-0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employed	0.01	0.24	0.05	0.08	0.64**	0.06	0.27**	0.07	0.06	0.12
	(0.10)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.08)	(0.24)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.25)
Homemaker	0.17	0.85**	0.45	0.14	0.59*	0.10	0.10	0.40**	0.06	-0.00
	(0.16)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.10)	(0.27)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.29)
Silent Gen.	-0.00	-0.66**	0.14	0.09	-0.05	-0.17	-0.03	-0.10	0.02	-0.46
	(0.11)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.08)	(0.28)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.28)
Gen. X	-0.06	0.07	-0.34	0.03	-0.04	-0.09	0.17	0.12	-0.20	0.14
	(0.13)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.10)	(0.27)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.27)
Millennial Gen.	0.33*	-0.40	-0.31	-0.03	-0.13	-0.02	-0.01	0.17	-0.22^	-0.18
	(0.13)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.11)	(0.32)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.30)
Kids<18	0.15	-0.80**	-0.72**	-0.11	-0.36	-0.01	-0.13	-0.12	-0.05	0.01
	(0.12)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.08)	(0.25)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.24)
Black	-0.04	-0.48	-0.21	-0.59*	-1.70**	-0.25	-0.60**	-0.03	0.04	-0.58
	(0.26)	(0.62)	(0.87)	(0.27)	(0.54)	(0.28)	(0.18)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.80)
Hispanic	0.19	-0.49	0.17	-0.32*	-0.14	-0.16	-0.60***	0.17	-0.18	-0.97**
	(0.15)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.16)	(0.41)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.35)
Other Race	0.03	-0.02	0.03	-0.27^	-0.37	0.08	-0.09	-0.12	0.22	-0.33
	(0.17)	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.15)	(0.47)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.44)
Primary Voter	0.23*	0.31	0.36^	0.24***	0.30	0.25**	0.20*	0.20^	0.13	-0.05
	(0.09)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.07)	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.20)
Political Know.	-0.03	0.30***	0.24**	0.13***	0.29**	0.04	0.03	0.10*	0.06	0.17
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.10)
South	-0.02	-0.04	-0.39*	0.08	0.19	0.05	0.20**	0.11	0.30***	0.26
	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.20)
Constant	0.30^			0.11		0.31^	0.88***	-0.43*	0.35^	
	(0.18)			(0.14)		(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	
Cut 1		-0.35	0.89*		-3.08***					-0.47
		(0.40)	(0.40)		(0.69)					(0.44)
Cut 2		1.93***	2.82***		-1.12*					3.46***
		(0.41)	(0.41)		(0.45)					(0.53)
Cut 3					0.91*					
					(0.41)					
Cut 4					2.59***					
					(0.43)					
Observations	5785	5776	5781	5786	5780	5786	5786	5780	5716	5784
Adjusted R^2	0.31	0.09	0.06	0.15	0.07	0.25	0.12	0.08	0.10	0.02

Entries are coefficients from OLS and Logit Models with standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights are applied. Models are restricted to Republican female respondents, including learners. Adjusted R^2 for ordered logits are calculated using Wherry's formula. ^ $p<0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 8: Predictors of Issue Attitudes for Republicans Men with Age Cohorts

	Abortion	Childcare	Education	Healthcare	Welfare	Gay Rights	Immigration	Mill. Tax	Defense	Gun Control
Religiosity	0.55***	0.06	0.08	0.03	-0.03	0.38***	-0.07^	-0.01	0.08*	-0.12
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.09)
Married	0.13	0.25	-0.14	0.07	0.29	0.20*	-0.06	0.06	-0.08	-0.00
	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.07)	(0.19)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.23)
Education	-0.04	-0.02	-0.00	-0.05^	-0.06	-0.07^	-0.19***	0.00	-0.18***	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.09)
Income	-0.00	0.03*	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.00	-0.01*	-0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Employed	-0.06	0.37^	0.02	0.22*	0.40*	0.00	0.09	0.30*	0.05	0.30
	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.09)	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.23)
Homemaker	0.00	1.38*	0.80	0.26	-0.55	-0.54	-0.29	0.29	0.50	-0.76
	(0.17)	(0.62)	(1.40)	(0.17)	(0.80)	(0.47)	(0.34)	(0.42)	(0.85)	(1.02)
Silent Gen.	0.06	0.73**	0.49*	0.22*	0.35	0.25*	0.05	0.42**	0.08	0.26
	(0.10)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.09)	(0.22)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.25)
Gen. X	0.01	-0.05	-0.22	0.18*	0.31	-0.24*	0.03	0.26^	-0.05	0.18
	(0.09)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.25)
Millennial Gen.	0.28**	0.06	-0.60*	0.00	0.13	-0.07	-0.25*	0.33*	-0.16	0.47^
	(0.10)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.09)	(0.24)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.28)
Kids<18	0.13	-0.52*	-0.58**	0.03	0.10	-0.04	0.11	-0.19	0.03	-0.03
	(0.08)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.25)
Black	0.10	-0.26	-1.96**	-0.36^	-0.30	-0.04	-0.23	0.22	-0.25	-0.66
	(0.18)	(0.65)	(0.73)	(0.19)	(0.44)	(0.28)	(0.21)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.61)
Hispanic	0.02	-0.28	-0.27	-0.42**	-0.50	0.03	-0.54***	0.06	0.31*	-0.02
	(0.18)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.15)	(0.40)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.43)
Other Race	0.08	0.15	-0.03	0.03	-0.29	0.15	-0.14	-0.09	0.02	-0.16
	(0.14)	(0.29)	(0.40)	(0.12)	(0.43)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.41)
Primary Voter	0.00	0.50**	0.49**	0.25***	0.29^	0.02	0.14*	0.48***	0.25***	0.31
	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.19)
Political Know.	0.01	0.40***	0.43***	0.09***	0.27***	-0.02	0.03	0.18***	-0.03	0.21*
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.08)
South	-0.02	-0.25	-0.80***	-0.00	0.13	0.07	0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.19)
Constant	0.23^			0.32**		0.56***	1.07***	-0.31^	0.80***	
	(0.13)			(0.12)		(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.14)	
Cut 1		-0.07	0.35		-3.31***					-0.73*
		(0.35)	(0.33)		(0.55)					(0.37)
Cut 2		2.27***	2.10***		-1.99***					2.89***
		(0.37)	(0.34)		(0.39)					(0.39)
Cut 3					0.22					
					(0.34)					
Cut 4					2.04***					
					(0.35)					
Observations	5825	5823	5824	5826	5825	5824	5826	5824	5785	5824
Adjusted R²	0.37	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.06	0.24	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.01

Entries are coefficients from OLS and Logit Models with standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights are applied. Models are restricted to Republican male respondents, including learners. Adjusted R^2 for ordered logits are calculated using Wherry's formula. ^ $p<0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 9: Predictors of Issue Attitudes for Democrat Women with Age Cohorts

	Abortion	Childcare	Education	Healthcare	Welfare	Gay Rights	Immigration	Mill. Tax	Defense	Gun Control
Religiosity	0.34***	0.01	-0.11	0.06*	-0.04	0.29***	0.09**	0.00	0.12**	-0.07
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Married	0.12*	-0.29^	-0.12	0.10^	-0.12	0.19**	-0.02	0.04	-0.12	0.38*
	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.19)
Education	-0.09***	-0.11	-0.07	-0.13***	-0.13^	-0.07*	-0.19***	-0.05*	-0.15***	-0.24*
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.09)
Income	-0.01*	0.04**	0.00	-0.01	0.04***	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.00	-0.04**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Employed	-0.02	-0.26	-0.35	0.08	0.35*	0.00	0.05	-0.05	0.17*	0.10
	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.21)
Homemaker	0.20^	-0.08	-0.13	0.01	0.07	0.20^	-0.06	-0.22*	0.01	-0.58^
	(0.11)	(0.26)	(0.38)	(0.10)	(0.25)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.31)
Silent Gen.	0.02	0.06	0.37	0.11	0.25	0.00	0.05	-0.08	0.05	-0.61*
	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.09)	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.28)
Gen. X	0.03	0.27	-0.06	0.03	0.10	0.05	0.08	0.16*	0.10	0.34
	(0.07)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.07)	(0.20)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.22)
Millennial Gen.	0.09	0.00	-0.42	0.11	0.10	-0.14^	-0.02	0.38***	-0.02	0.71**
	(0.07)	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.24)
Kids<18	0.01	-0.57**	0.04	0.04	-0.12	-0.10	0.07	-0.03	0.07	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.20)
Black	-0.03	-0.61**	-0.45	-0.19*	-0.37^	0.30***	-0.17*	0.18*	0.03	-0.19
	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.33)	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.27)
Hispanic	0.05	0.13	-0.14	-0.11	-0.18	0.10	-0.74***	0.24*	-0.17	-0.81**
	(0.08)	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.08)	(0.23)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.28)
Other Race	0.11	-0.11	-0.15	0.12	-0.15	0.20^	0.08	0.24^	-0.21	0.21
	(0.14)	(0.32)	(0.42)	(0.11)	(0.36)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.30)
Primary Voter	-0.01	-0.18	-0.03	-0.11^	-0.34*	-0.04	-0.09	0.02	0.16*	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.19)
Political Know.	-0.11***	0.11	0.00	-0.08**	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.11***	-0.04	-0.07*	-0.08
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.09)
South	0.01	0.16	0.03	-0.05	0.05	0.13^	-0.03	-0.02	0.16*	0.14
	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.19)
Constant	0.11			-0.06		-0.18	0.59***	-0.23**	0.10	
	(0.10)			(0.11)		(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)	
Cut 1		-0.36	0.84*		-2.77***					-0.15
		(0.27)	(0.37)		(0.33)					(0.32)
Cut 2		2.16***	3.00***		-1.25***					2.91***
		(0.31)	(0.44)		(0.29)					(0.42)
Cut 3					0.93***					
					(0.28)					
Constant					2.50***					
					(0.31)					
Observations	5698	5690	5698	5704	5686	5701	5704	5696	5437	5699
Adjusted R^2	0.28	0.05	0.02	0.11	0.05	0.26	0.16	0.12	0.11	0.01

Entries are coefficients from OLS and Logit Models with standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights are applied. Models are restricted to Democratic female respondents, including learners. Adjusted R^2 for ordered logits are calculated using Wherry's formula. ^ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table 10. Predictors of Issue Attitudes for **Democrats Men with Age Cohorts**

	Abortion	Childcare	Education	Healthcare	Welfare	Gay Rights	Immigration	Mill. Tax	Defense	Gun Control
Religiosity	0.35***	-0.05	-0.02	0.04	0.03	0.27***	0.13***	0.04	0.10*	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.09)
Married	0.03	-0.18	-0.04	0.01	0.07	0.06	-0.06	-0.01	0.04	0.18
	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.07)	(0.19)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.20)
Education	-0.15***	-0.13^	-0.15	-0.11***	-0.08	-0.14***	-0.18***	-0.02	-0.07^	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.09)
Income	-0.01	0.02^	-0.01	0.00	0.04**	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.01^	-0.02^
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employed	-0.01	-0.02	-0.21	0.04	0.24	-0.23**	0.10	-0.20**	-0.07	-0.06
	(0.08)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.19)
Homemaker	0.08	1.07**	0.18	0.23	0.36	-0.19	0.02	-0.44***	-0.66**	1.13
	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.81)	(0.29)	(0.97)	(0.21)	(0.51)	(0.10)	(0.21)	(1.50)
Silent Gen.	0.05	-0.02	-0.06	0.11	0.01	0.10	-0.09	-0.15*	0.03	-0.77**
	(0.12)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.28)
Gen. X	0.08	0.04	-0.35	0.02	0.11	-0.04	-0.04	0.08	-0.12	-0.19
	(0.09)	(0.22)	(0.28)	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.21)
Millennial Gen.	0.10	-0.03	-0.34	-0.04	0.11	-0.21**	-0.27**	0.25**	-0.10	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.08)	(0.22)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.25)
Kids<18	0.07	-0.35^	-0.03	0.03	-0.36^	0.07	-0.02	0.05	0.00	0.04
	(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.07)	(0.20)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.21)
Black	-0.00	-0.82***	-0.21	-0.14^	-0.69**	0.21*	-0.35***	0.11	0.06	-0.62*
	(0.11)	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.08)	(0.24)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.25)
Hispanic	0.04	-0.28	0.04	-0.04	-0.39^	0.31***	-0.84***	0.06	-0.05	-0.37
	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.24)
Other Race	0.16	0.66*	0.34	0.11	0.15	0.39*	0.14	0.11	0.01	-0.80*
	(0.11)	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.12)	(0.32)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.33)
Primary Voter	0.01	0.02	0.13	-0.04	-0.21	0.08	0.02	0.07	-0.03	0.24
	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.19)
Political Know.	-0.10***	-0.09	0.01	-0.17***	-0.18*	-0.05*	-0.21***	-0.11***	-0.24***	-0.41***
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.08)
South	-0.04	-0.08	-0.67**	-0.01	0.14	-0.08	0.12	0.11^	0.03	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.18)	(0.22)	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.20)
Constant	0.38***			-0.10		0.27*	0.85***	-0.06	0.25^	
	(0.11)			(0.10)		(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.15)	
Cut 1		-0.83**	0.14		-3.09***					-1.21***
		(0.29)	(0.31)		(0.33)					(0.28)
Cut 2		1.70***	2.51***		-1.70***					1.90***
		(0.30)	(0.40)		(0.29)					(0.34)
Cut 3					0.63*					
					(0.28)					
Cut 4					2.42***					
					(0.30)					
Observations	5768	5772	5776	5777	5768	5775	5778	5774	5685	5775
Adjusted R²	0.30	0.03	0.00	0.15	0.05	0.29	0.26	0.16	0.14	-0.00

Entries are coefficients from OLS and Logit Models with standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights are applied. Models are restricted to Democratic male respondents, including learners. Adjusted R² for ordered logits are calculated using Wherry's formula. ^ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Table 11: Predictors of Political Values for Republicans with Age Cohorts

	Women				Men			
	Ideology	Scope of Gov.	Mod. Sexism	Egalitarianism	Ideology	Scope of Gov.	Mod. Sexism	Egalitarianism
Religiosity	0.39***	0.07^	0.09*	0.00	0.16***	0.01	0.03	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Married	-0.13	0.02	0.18^	-0.04	0.12	0.11	-0.01	-0.13
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Education	0.01	0.05	-0.07	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.04	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Income	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01^	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employed	-0.12	0.10	0.06	-0.12	0.04	0.17*	0.13	-0.20^
	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Homemaker	0.22^	0.26*	0.23	-0.28*	-0.20	-0.06	-0.37	-0.23
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.36)	(0.69)	(0.37)	(0.24)
Silent Gen.	0.02	0.03	-0.14	0.07	0.37**	0.38***	0.15	-0.36**
	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Gen. X	0.08	0.02	0.12	-0.13	-0.08	0.09	0.17	-0.20^
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Millennial Gen.	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.08	0.10	-0.18
	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Kids<18	-0.19	-0.20*	-0.02	0.24*	-0.17	-0.17*	-0.09	0.09
	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Black	-1.30**	-0.54*	0.13	0.24	0.06	-0.25	-0.37*	0.29
	(0.40)	(0.23)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.26)
Hispanic	-0.41*	-0.34*	0.15	0.08	-0.24	-0.26*	-0.22	0.07
	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.13)
Other Race	-0.18	-0.02	0.04	-0.11	0.06	-0.06	-0.07	0.03
	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Primary Voter	0.23*	0.27***	0.05	-0.19*	0.25**	0.23***	0.12	-0.18*
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Political Know.	0.12**	0.21***	0.07^	-0.10*	0.20***	0.19***	0.14***	-0.12***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
South	-0.07	0.02	0.02	-0.11	-0.05	-0.04	-0.18*	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Constant	4.96***	-0.20	-0.03	0.05	4.62***	0.06	0.08	0.22
	(0.22)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Observations	5778	5786	5786	5786	5824	5826	5826	5826
R^2	0.18	0.20	0.05	0.07	0.16	0.20	0.08	0.08

Entries are coefficients from OLS and Logit Models with standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights are applied. Models are restricted to Republican respondents, including learners. ^ $p<0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 12: Predictors of Issue Attitudes for Democrats with Age Cohorts

	Women				Men			
	Ideology	Scope of Gov.	Mod. Sexism	Egalitarianism	Ideology	Scope of Gov.	Mod. Sexism	Egalitarianism
Religiosity	0.20***	-0.03	0.00	0.05	0.27***	0.00	-0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Married	0.19^	0.17**	0.12^	-0.13*	0.20	0.00	-0.11	-0.16*
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Education	-0.24***	-0.04^	-0.09**	0.07*	-0.16***	-0.06*	-0.03	0.06^
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Income	0.00	-0.01^	0.02**	0.01^	0.00	0.00	0.01^	-0.01^
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Employed	0.11	0.06	0.14^	-0.10	-0.21^	0.05	0.10	0.02
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Homemaker	0.07	0.12	0.30**	-0.02	-0.72**	0.39	0.17	-0.36
	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.22)	(0.44)	(0.30)	(0.36)
Silent Gen.	0.12	0.07	0.13	-0.17*	0.11	-0.01	-0.10	-0.13
	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Gen. X	-0.11	0.09	0.07	-0.08	0.22	0.01	-0.06	-0.14
	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Millennial Gen.	-0.18	0.11	0.24*	0.01	-0.05	0.09	0.10	-0.21*
	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Kids<18	-0.10	-0.08	0.03	0.01	0.06	-0.09	0.10	-0.03
	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Black	0.10	-0.36***	-0.32**	0.30***	-0.03	-0.42***	-0.38***	0.40***
	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Hispanic	0.09	-0.06	-0.14	-0.02	0.06	-0.28***	-0.22*	0.15^
	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Other Race	0.30	0.06	-0.07	-0.00	-0.17	-0.13	0.09	0.02
	(0.26)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.14)
Primary Voter	-0.15	-0.04	-0.12^	0.11^	-0.05	-0.06	-0.08	-0.01
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Political Know.	-0.14**	-0.05*	-0.13***	0.07*	-0.23***	-0.10***	-0.14***	0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
South	0.07	-0.02	0.07	-0.02	0.05	0.13*	0.11	0.07
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Constant	4.20***	-0.37***	-0.35*	0.14	4.27***	-0.14	0.03	0.13
	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.12)
Observations	5669	5703	5704	5704	5752	5778	5778	5778
R^2	0.16	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.18	0.09	0.08	0.11

Entries are coefficients from OLS and Logit Models with standard errors in parentheses. Survey weights are applied. Models are restricted to Democratic respondents, including learners. ^ p<0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Policy Preferences: Alternative Measures of Engaged Partisans

In this section we first replicate Figure 2a from our original analysis where we compare the policy preferences of Republicans who voted in the primary election to those who did not vote in the primary election. Then, we replicate this figure using two alternative measures of "engaged partisans." The first measure compares Republicans who voted in the general election to those who did not vote in the general election, and second measure compares those who voted in the primary election to those who did not vote in either the general or primary election. These figures indicate that the results reported in figure 2a are robust to alternative measures of engaged partisans.

Figure 2. Republican Primary Election Voters vs. Republican Non-Primary Voters
(Replication of Figure 2a)

**Figure 3. Republican General Election Voters vs. Republican Non-General Voters**

Figure 4. Republican Primary Election Voters vs. Republican Non-Voters